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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN AID
by
Yunhee Choi
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2021
Under the Supervision of Professor Uk Heo

Throughout three essays, this dissertation investigates three important aspects of the
effectiveness of foreign aid: whether and how foreign aid is effective. Chapter 1 explains the
background of the study on foreign aid. This introduction chapter also summarizes my arguments
and the empirical strategies of each essay. Chapter 2 analyzes when foreign aid helps the
recipient countries’ economic growth. In specific, this chapter argues that the political leaders’
survival strategy determines how to spend the aid, and it makes the difference in the aid
effectiveness to achieve economic growth. Using a panel dataset for the 82 aid recipient
countries between 1960 and 2010, this study finds that foreign aid is more likely to lead to
economic growth in the case of a large winning coalition. In Chapter 3, I examine how foreign
aid reduces political violence in recipient countries. Based on the findings of Chapter 2, I further
argue that aid recipients experience less political violence due to its contribution to economic
growth. Utilizing a moderated mediation model, I find that the recipient country achieves
positive economic growth in a large winning coalition and consequently experiences fewer civil
wars and domestic terrorist attacks. Chapter 4 investigates the effectiveness of foreign aid from
the perspective of the donor country. In particular, I argue that foreign aid leads to more export
of donor country to the recipient because implementing aid serves as building and enhancing the
ii

relationship between donors and recipients. Using Korean bilateral aid and export data to
recipient countries between 1965 and 2015, this chapter shows that bilateral aid increases the
donor’s export toward recipient countries. The effect becomes more prominent in the long term.
Chapter 5 concludes. This concluding chapter emphasizes the main arguments and findings and
draws aid policy recommendations.
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

Foreign aid has been provided for more than 60 years. Notwithstanding short-term fluctuations,
the number of aid donors and recipients and the overall amount of aid given have steadily
increased during this time. Today, the international aid policy is a recognized part of
international relations and global cooperation, employing hundreds of thousands of people and
comprising a multi-billion dollar ‘business.’ Since 1960, more than US$ 32 trillion of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) has been disbursed around the world. In 2020 alone, the total
amount of development aid was approximately US$ 161 billion, which marked a 3.5% rise from
the last year and has been more than quadrupled from about US$ 37 billion in 1960 in real terms
(OECD 2020).
This foreign assistance is also a substantial part of the international money transfer along
with FDI and remittance as well as of national revenue in many developing countries. It
represents approximately 0.2% of global economic output and 0.3% of donor countries’ gross
national income (GNI). Also, for example, in 2000, 47% of Ghana’s government budget and
74% of Mozambique’s government budget were from foreign aid (Real Aid: Ending Aid
Dependency 2011, 8). In 2018, a third of Ethiopia’s budget was covered with foreign aid: the
total budget is US$ 14 billion, and about US$ 5 billion is covered from aid money (ESAT News,
June 14, 2017).
Given the substantial amount of aid and the countries and people involved in this aid
business thus, examining the effectiveness of foreign aid is a critical task for efficient and proper
implementation of the policy. Here, the effectiveness of aid refers to whether the foreign aid
1

policy achieves its goals or not. And if so, to what extent. As the most important goal, the
development aid is primarily designed to help the recipient countries’ economic and social wellbeing and people. Specifically, the aid is supposed to go to recipient countries, helping them
spend the money to relieve hunger, eliminate malnutrition, reduce poverty, and eradicate
diseases. It is also provided to help them construct the basic economic and social infrastructure to
increase the efficient production and competitiveness of the countries. For that reason, examining
the economic growth of the recipient country is the richest and chief area concerning aid
effectiveness.1
However, foreign aid has also been an essential part of the international system and one
of the vital foreign policies for donor countries pursuing their interests and aiming to build and
enhance the relationship with recipient countries. Giving and receiving aid is a form of the flow
of resources, transferring money, people, and services from one country or region to another. For
instance, donor countries may often provide foreign aid to enhance their security. Economic
assistance may be provided to prevent friendly governments from falling under the influence of
unfriendly ones or as a return for getting permission to establish or use military bases on foreign
soil. Foreign aid also may be provided to achieve a country’s diplomatic goals, enabling it to
gain diplomatic recognition, sustaining support for its positions in international organizations, or
increasing its diplomats’ access to foreign representatives. Other purposes of foreign aid include
increasing a country’s exports (e.g., through programs that require the recipient country to use
the aid to buy the donor country’s agricultural products or manufactured goods) and spreading its
language, culture, or religion. Donor countries also provide aid to relieve the suffering caused by
1

Some of the studies are Hansen and Tarp 2001; Moreira 2005; Gyimah-Brempong, Racine, and Gyapong 2012;
Burnside and Dollar 1997, 2000; Lensink and White 2001; Easterly 2003; Karras 2006; Svensson 2000;
Economides, Kalyvitis, and Philippopoulos 2008; Feeny and DeSilva 2012; Kako 2018; Ssozi, Asongu, and
Amavilah 2019; Lin, Vu, and Hartley 2019; Harb and Hall 2019.
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natural or human-made disasters such as famine, disease, and war and address various global
problems, including terrorism, crimes, and pollution.
This dissertation is composed of three essays that examine these various aspects of the
effectiveness of foreign aid for both sides, recipients, and donors. This dissertation, in particular,
explores these impacts of aid from the perspective of the political economy of aid, emphasizing
that aid is not only financial but also political money and resources. The three essays in this
dissertation examine the impact of foreign aid on economic growth (Chapter 2) and political
violence (Chapter 3) on recipient countries and export from donors to recipients (Chapter 4).
This dissertation provides theoretical understanding and empirical evidence on the effectiveness
of foreign aid throughout these three essays.
By doing so, this dissertation contributes to the literature on aid effectiveness by
underscoring that undeniably, promoting growth and eliminating poverty are the critical
dimensions of giving foreign aid. However, aid also serves many other purposes simultaneously
and impacts these other dimensions for donors and international relations. It is necessary to
investigate these various impacts of aid, especially for the donor countries, who face domestic
skepticism and reluctance to the aid. The reason is that if aid is shown to result directly in or to
contribute indirectly to tangible and identifiable benefits for those receiving and giving it, it
provides practical as well as humanitarian justification for the aid and continues to provide more
of it. If, on the other hand, no direct or identifiable indirect benefits from providing it are evident,
then the reason and practice for providing aid fall away. Indeed, sustaining meaningful foreign
aid requires the efficacy of both sides, the demand side and the supply side, who believe giving
aid is beneficial not only to recipients but also to donors.

3

The first essay, “Foreign Aid, Winning Coalition, and Economic Growth,” addresses the
conditional effectiveness of foreign aid on the economic growth of recipient countries.
Theoretically, I argue that the economic effects of foreign aid can vary over time and region due
to the different political conditions of each recipient country. The same amount of foreign aid to
two different countries can have completely different results because aid in one country goes
where it is supposed to be, while aid in another country may not be used for the intended
purpose. These different paths of aid spending come from the political leaders’ survival strategy,
and the fungibility of aid allows the leaders to use the money for their political gains.
Specifically, to maximize the chance to stay in office, governments in the case of a large winning
coalition spend the aid money as it is intended for, providing public goods, which is conducive to
economic growth. On the other hand, in the countries in the case of a small winning coalition, the
money is spent as private goods and wasted and thus less effective on growth.
To test the theoretical prediction, this essay constructed a panel dataset containing 82
developing countries from 1960 to 2010 and utilized the GMM estimation technique. The
empirical results showed that the interaction between foreign aid and the winning coalition’s size
significantly affects its economic growth. Mainly, it found that in the case of large winning
coalitions, the economy grows as ODA increases, while in the case of small winning coalitions,
the growth rate declines as ODA increases.
The second essay, “Foreign Aid, Economic Growth, and Political Violence,” deals with
the indirect effects of foreign aid on political violence in recipient countries. Building upon the
first essay’s theoretical reasoning and empirical findings, I further argue that foreign aid reduces
political violence in recipient countries via its role in economic growth. More specifically, I
claim that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is more favorable in a society where the
4

political leader relies on a broad set of the winning coalition because they spend the money more
effectively. Then, the growing national economy, owing to the help of aid, in turn, strengthens
the government and weakens the potential rebels, which ultimately leads to less political
violence.
To test the theoretical argument, I collected data on the aid recipient countries and
empirically examined the indirect conditional relationship between foreign aid, the winning
coalition’s size, economic growth, and civil war and domestic terrorism by utilizing a moderated
mediation model. The results showed that foreign aid reduces civil wars and domestic terrorist
attacks via economic growth, which is moderated by the winning coalition’s size.
The third essay, “Foreign Aid and Donor Export: Korea’s ODA,” considers the spillover
effect of the foreign aid on donor’s export to recipient countries. Theoretically, I argue that
foreign aid increases donor export to the recipients. First, there is a direct mechanism when
explicit or implicit aid conditionality is involved (e.g., tied aid). Second, although the primary
aim of foreign aid focuses on promoting the economic development of recipients, it also serves
the role of building a political, economic, and social relationship between donor and recipient
countries. In turn, those spillover effects of foreign aid increase donor’s export to the recipient
countries.
To test the theoretical argument, I empirically investigated Korea’s bilateral ODA and its
export to the recipients between 1965 and 2015. By applying a dynamic gravity model with the
GMM estimation technique, this essay found empirical evidence that Korean bilateral ODA
increases its export to recipients. The impact is intensified as time goes by.

5

Chapter 2. Foreign Aid, Winning Coalition, and Economic Growth

2.1. Introduction
According to the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), ODA
(Official Development Assistance) is a type of government aid that is primarily intended to
enhance developing countries’ economic development and welfare. ODA has increased over
time, and by 2019, the accumulated amount of foreign aid from official donors reached US$ 4.5
trillion.2 In 2019 alone, ODA from the member countries of DAC (Development Assistance
Committee) totaled US$ 152.8 billion, an increase of 1.4% compared to 2018. The amount of aid
represents 0.3% of the donor countries’ combined GNI (Figure 1, OECD 2019) and accounts for
more than two-thirds of external finance directed to LDCs (the Least Developed Countries)
(OECD 2019, 1).

2

It was calculated by the author using OECD data from 1960 to 2019.
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Figure 2.1: Trends in Net ODA Flows by DAC Countries (Data for 2019 are preliminary)

Source: OECD.
Given the growing amount of aid and its significance to the recipient economy, many
researchers and policymakers have studied its effectiveness on economic growth. There are three
perspectives on the effects of economic aids on growth. One school of thought argues that aid
flows reduce poverty and promote the economic growth of the recipients (Chenery and Strout
1966; Papenek 1972, 1973; Hansen and Tarp 2001; Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp 2004; Moreira
2005; Economides, Kalyvitis, and Philippopoulos 2008; Gyimah-Brempong, Racine, and
Gyapong 2012; Galiani, Knack, Xu, and Zou 2016). In principle, the money increases the
recipient country’s capital resource, which can be used for its economic and social development.
For this school of thought, “foreign aid does not simply save lives; it also lays the groundwork
for lasting, long-term economic progress (Gates and Gates 2014; requoted from Ravallion 2016,
519).” On the other hand, another group of scholars emphasizes the fact that poverty still looms
large and underdevelopment persists in many of the recipients and claims that the aid does
7

nothing but harms to the developing countries (Boone 1994; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Remmer
2004; Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2006; Moyo 2009; Feeny and De Silva 2012).
These scholars point out that corruption, rent-seeking, and patronage politics prevalent in
recipient countries hinder the proper usage of aid. For this school of thought, “giving more aid
than we currently give will not make the situation better (Deaton 2013, 272)” and aid
“perpetuates the cycle of poverty and derails sustainable economic development (Moyo 2009,
28).” In contrast to the groups discussed above, another perspective highlights the conditional
effect of the aid. That is, foreign aid can be either effective or ineffective depending on the
domestic circumstance of recipient countries, such as governance, economic policy, and political
institutions (Mosley, Hudson, and Horrell 1987; Burnside and Dollar 1997, 2000; Svensson
2000a, 2000b; Lensink and White 2001; Islam 2005; Wagner 2014).
This essay engages in this debate, the nexus between foreign aid and economic growth,
by arguing that the effect of aid is conditional on the size of the winning coalition of the recipient
countries. According to selectorate theory, to maximize their political survivals, political leaders
in the case of a large winning coalition spend foreign aid to provide public goods, which is
conducive to their economy. On the other hand, political leaders in the case of a small winning
coalition spend the money to provide private goods, which does not help the economy. To test
the theoretical prediction, I constructed a panel dataset containing 82 developing countries from
1960 to 2010 and empirically examined the interaction effect of foreign aid and the winning
coalition’s size on economic growth by utilizing the GMM estimation technique.
The contribution of this essay to the literature is twofold. Theoretically, it advanced our
knowledge of foreign aid in terms of a political economy perspective to explain the aid-growth
nexus. Specifically, it emphasized the role of political leaders’ survival strategy in how to spend
8

aid, which makes the difference in its effectiveness. Second, empirically this essay was better
able to address the endogeneity concern, the most commonly challenging issue, in the aid-growth
literature and provided robust evidence by utilizing the GMM method.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the existing
literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid on economic growth. In section 3 I elaborate the
theoretical arguments on foreign aid and economic growth by introducing the winning coalition
as an intermediating role and draw hypotheses for the empirical test. Section 4 presents data and
methods used to explore the dynamics of foreign aid, the winning coalition size, and their
interaction effect on economic growth. Section 5 presents the empirical results and discusses the
implication. Section 6 concludes.

2.2. Literature Review: Foreign Aid and Economic Growth
The effectiveness of foreign aid on economic growth has been one of the most accumulated but
still controversial issues in the international cooperation and developmental economy literature.
In general, it can be categorized into three schools of thought: positive, negative, and conditional
effect of aid. Each has its theoretical arguments and provides empirical evidence.
2.2.1. Positive Effects of Aid on Growth
A group of scholars argues that aid facilitates economic growth via capital accumulation
(Chenery and Shout 1966; Papanek 1972; Levy 1988; Islam 1992; Hansen and Tarp 2000;
Aizenman, Jinjarak, and Park 2013; Adeola 2017). They view the lack of capital accumulation as
the main reason for underdevelopment and poverty. Thus, aid inflow helps increase capital
resources, which can be used in various sectors of the economy. Specifically, the money can be
9

used to mitigate foreign exchange constraints, provide access to new technologies, improve
management skills, and allow easier access to foreign markets. All of these usages of foreign aid
could promote economic growth.
Sachs (2005) puts it as a “poverty trap” to emphasize the role of foreign aid in that
situation. The extremely poor are in a poverty trap because they are too poor to save money.
Thereby, the country lacks domestic capital accumulation, which is the fundamental resource of
government investment and growth. Saving, indeed, can only happen when an economic unit
(either an individual or country) has an income beyond the required for survival. When many
individuals have to consume all their income to survive, the economy is unlikely to grow. In this
perspective, foreign aid, therefore, can be a vital input to supplement those low accumulations of
capital and act as a big push to break the poverty trap and stimulate the national economy in
developing countries (Sachs 2005, 246-249).
Scholars have conducted empirical analyses and found evidence for the argument. For
instance, Papanek (1973) conducted a cross-national analysis of 34 countries for the 1950s and
51 countries for the 1960s. The author found that aid is positively correlated with growth. The
effect is prominent in Asia and the Mediterranean countries, where the most crucial constraint of
growth is the lack of capital, mainly foreign exchange. Dowling and Hiemenz (1983) studied the
aid-growth nexus for 13 Asian countries. They found a positive relationship between the two
variables while controlling for the effect of trade, finance, and government intervention. Levy
(1988) examined Sub-Saharan African countries and concluded that foreign aid contributes to
economic growth in the region via increasing public investment. Hansen and Tarp (2001) added
evidence on the positive effect of aid via the public investment by examining 56 countries
between 1974 and 1993. Using a standard overlapping generations (OLG) model, Dalgaard,
10

Hansen, and Tarp (2004) also found a similar result, further revealing that the effect is strong in
non-tropical regions.
Later, many studies confirmed this positive impact of foreign aid on economic growth by
utilizing more sophisticated model specifications and methods. For example, using the
generalized method of moment (GMM) estimation, Moreira (2005) found a positive relationship
between aid and growth for 48 developing countries between 1970 to 1998. More recently,
Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010) argued that aid has a positive and statistically significant causal
effect on growth over the long run. Specifically, using various instrumentation strategies such as
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML), they found that the expected return to an
average annual aid inflow equals 5% of GDP over the period 1970-2007. Such an aid inflow is
expected to increase the average annual economic growth rate by around 1.5%. Galiani, Knack,
Xu, and Zou (2016) investigated 35 countries that crossed the income threshold from below
between 1987 and 2010 and found an economically sizeable effect of aid on growth. In
particular, a one percent increase in the aid to GNI ratio decreases the annual real growth rate in
GDP per capita by approximately 0.35. In sum, those studies theorized that aid could lead to the
economic growth of the recipients by increasing the capital accumulation and provided empirical
evidence supporting the arguments.
2.2.2. Negative Effects of Aid on Growth
In contrast to the findings of the positive relationship between foreign aid and economic growth,
another group of scholars asserts that foreign aid does not necessarily increase domestic
resources of the recipient countries and suggests five reasons why aid does not work (Friedman
1958; Bauer 1972; Werlin 2005; Easterly 2006; Collier 2007; Moyo 2009). First, the money
simply could be wasted on the personal spending of the leaders and government officials.
11

Second, it could encourage corruption, not only in aid projects or policy but also in more broad
ways, such as subsidizing unplanned industries or regions. Third, it could undermine the
incentives for the private sector to invest or to improve its productivity. For example, aid can
also cause currency appreciation, undermining the price competitiveness of the production of all
tradable goods (known as the Dutch diseases).3 In addition, if not managed appropriately, food
aid can reduce the prices and hurt the income of the agriculture industry of the recipients. Fourth,
aid flows can reduce domestic savings of both private (through its impact on the interest rate)
and government (through its impact on government revenue). Fifth, it can help bad governments
keep in power, which makes them be reluctant for meaningful reform and perpetuate poor
economic policies (Radelet, Clemens, and Bhavnani 2005, 2).
Turning to empirical evidence, Griffin and Enos (1970) are the first ones to report the
negative correlation between aid and growth in 27 recipient countries. Since then, many other
studies have followed, showing similar results (Mosley, 1980; Dowling and Hiemenz, 1982;
Singh, 1985). For example, Boone (1995) examined 96 countries between 1971 and 1990 and
found that aid is not related to saving or labor productivity, which are major contributing factors
to growth. Based on the evidence, he concluded that aid programs do not help the economy.
Similarly, Remmer (2004) investigated the impact of aid on the fiscal policy of the recipient
governments. By using panel data for the period between 1970 and 1999, the author found that
aid increases the size of government. However, it does not necessarily promote the efficient use

According to Ranis (2012, 9), “a county generally experiences appreciation of the real exchange rate as it
industrializes, and long-run appreciation of the real exchange rate is driven by a rise in productivity, output, and
incomes. However, appreciation resulting from aid inflows is different: aid causes an immediate appreciation of the
exchange rate before increasing productivity and output. This appreciation can have harmful effects resulting from a
potential decline in exports, and the fact that aid finances a level of consumption and investment that is higher than
the country's economic output would permit.”
3
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of the revenue. Specifically, he argued that aid makes governments not only increase ineffective
public spending but also reduce the willingness for revenue generation.
Moyo (2009), in her book, Dead Aid, argued that foreign aid is easy money that fosters
corruption and distorts economies, creating a culture of dependency and economic laziness, after
examining the aid practice in the Africa region. Many examples are shown, including Mobutu
Sese Seko from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Idi Amin from Uganda, Bokassa from the
Central African Republic. Later, Feeny and De Silva (2012) also found that aid hurt growth in
recipient countries and questioned what constraints limit aid effectiveness. Then, they came up
with some ideas, named “absorptive capacity constraints (ACCs).” ACCs consist of capital
constraints, policy and institutional constraints, macroeconomic constraints, donor practices, and
social and cultural factors, which ultimately limit the government’s capacity to absorb aid money
to their economy. To summarize, those opponents of aid argue that aid does not necessarily
facilitate the recipient countries’ growth because the aid is often wasted and misappropriated.
2.2.3. Conditional Effects of Aid on Growth
The third school of thought emphasizes that the effectiveness of aid is conditional, which
depends on various circumstances of the recipient countries (Mosley, Hudson, and Horrell 1987;
Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett 1997; Svensson 2000b; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and
Dollar 2002; Kosack 2003; Dollar and Levin 2005; Islam 2003; Wagner 2014). For example,
Mosley, Hudson, and Horrell (1987) found no correlation between aid and the growth rate of
GNP. Then, they pointed out that the recipient countries’ economic institutions played a role in
this no relationship and argued that the degree of economic and financial development of the
countries impacted the efficiency of aid implementation. Specifically, the authors claimed that
the underdeveloped economic system makes aid money easily leak into non-productive
13

expenditure in the public sector and be transmitted to the private sectors, resulting in adverse
price effects on the market. Later, Burnside and Dollar (2000) examined 59 countries between
1970 and 1993, and the result showed no statistical relationship between aid and growth. Instead,
they found that aid is positively associated with economic growth only in the countries
implementing market-friendly economic policies, promoting trade openness and economic
freedom.
Meanwhile, Wagner (2014) found that the relationship between aid and growth is
nonlinear. Specifically, using data for 89 developing countries during 1970–2009, he showed
that aid is effective only above a critical level and becomes detrimental to growth at a high level
of aid. The study further found that recipient countries’ economic stability modifies the threshold
of the aid inflow. That is, aid is more helpful to those countries where are economically
vulnerable and unstable. Relatedly, Rahnama, Fawaz, and Gittings (2017) found that foreign aid
harms economic growth in low-income developing countries, while it positively affects growth
in high-income developing countries by examining 55 low-income and 56 high-income countries
from 1970 to 2010.
On the other hand, other scholars underlined its political context. For instance, using data
on 58 countries between 1970 and 1993, Svensson (2000b) found that aid on growth, especially
for long-run growth, is conditional on the degree of political and civil liberties of the recipient
country. Mainly, he showed that aid has a positive impact on growth in countries with an
institutionalized check system on governmental power, that is, in more democratic countries.
Similarly, Islam (2003) also found that aid has a positive impact on growth in a politically stable
regime (under a totalitarian/tyrant regime than under a tinpot regime) by looking at 33 countries

14

(21 African and 11 Asian countries) between 1968 and 1992.4 In short, despite the different
aspects the studies pointed out, the last school of thought shares the view that the effectiveness of
foreign aid varies among the recipient countries.

2.3. Theory: Foreign Aid, Winning Coalition, and Economic Growth
So, does foreign aid help the economic growth of the recipient countries? As shown in the
previous section, the findings of the existing studies are inconclusive, and the debate is still
ongoing. Proponents of foreign aid focus on supplying more capital to the economy and its
positive effect on economic growth, whereas opponents emphasize its malfunction and
corruption and its harmful effects on growth. However, the economic effects of foreign aid can
vary over time and region due to the different political conditions of each recipient country. The
same amount of foreign aid to two different countries can have completely different results
because aid in one country can go where it is supposed to be, while aid in another country may
not be used for the intended purpose.
This essay argues that these different ways of spending aid come from the political
leaders’ survival strategy. The fungibility of aid allows the leaders to use the money for their
political gains. Specifically, to maximize the chance to stay in office, governments in the case of

4

The author argued that the aid effect on growth among authoritarian countries varies depending on the different
rational policy decisions. The distinction between a weak and a strong authoritarian regime depends on their
objectives and the levels of repression and loyalty used to achieve them. Wintrobe (1990, 1998) distinguished four
different types of an authoritarian regime – timocrats, tinpots, totalitarians, and tyrants. The main objective of a
timocrat or a benevolent despot is to maximize public welfare. To achieve this objective, the timocrat uses a
minimum level of repression and generates maximum loyalty. Tinpots seek personal consumption and avoid
unnecessary spending on repression or generating loyalty to maximize consumption. Both timocrats and tinpots are
weak forms of dictatorship. Totalitarians look for maximum power. They use highly repressive measures but at the
same time use as much of national output as are necessary to increase economic growth, thereby generating
sufficient loyalty required to stay in power. Tyrants also look for maximum power and use maximum repression but
do not rely upon institutions that allow them to generate enough loyalty (Islam 2003, 36-37).
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a large winning coalition spend the aid money as it is intended for, providing public goods,
which is conducive to economic growth. On the other hand, in the countries in the case of a small
winning coalition, the money is spent as private goods and wasted and thus less effective on
growth.
2.3.1. Fungibility of Foreign Aid
In principle, foreign aid should help the recipient economy because these assistances aim to
provide the country’s primary economic and social infrastructure. However, as shown in the
existing studies, not all aid recipients achieve the desired goal: aid effectiveness on economic
growth differs among the recipients. The reason is that aid money is fungible, and it is rare that
the aid money entirely goes into where it is supposed to be.5
Ideally, for the theoretical causal mechanism between foreign aid and economic growth
to work, as the proponents of aid argue, foreign aid should be reflected directly and entirely in
the government budget and public spending (Wright and Winters 2010). That is, aid is spent
entirely in non-fungible ways. However, that is not what happens in reality. Aid is routinely
spent in fungible ways, and the degree or extent of it varies among the aid recipient countries and
governments.
For example, some countries used foreign aid mainly in the way the donor countries and
international aid agencies intended, such as government consumption and investment in

5

Aid is fungible, by definition, if the recipient country uses the aid resources for purposes other than those intended
by the donor (McGuire 1978). This fungible aid usage is distinctive from other external capital inflows (Singer
2010; Leblang 2011). In specific, compared to tax revenue, spending aid is less binding and accountable for the
political leaders and governments because it is not collected from their citizens. Additionally, comparing to FDI and
personal remittance, spending aid is more controlled by the leaders and officials because the money mostly goes to
or needs the permission of the recipient governments to be spent. In this regard, aid is 'unearned income and freer
resource (in other words, 'non-tax but directly allocated government revenue'), allowing political leaders and
governments to use it in fungible ways.
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education, public health, and poverty reduction. Gupta (1993) found little evidence of the
fungible usage of foreign aid across development expenditure in India during the 1970s-1980s.
Pack and Pack (1990) also found that in Indonesia during 1966 and 1986, foreign aid raised the
total amount of the public expenditure. Most of the aid was spent to provide the economic and
social infrastructure of the country.6
However, as mentioned earlier, aid money is highly fungible, and we see many cases the
money was used in various fungible ways (McGillivray and Morrissey 2004). The government
simply pockets the money and keeps it for themselves or distributes some of them directly to its
supporters as a form of private goods. Mobuto Sese Seko (The former President of Zaire from
1965 to 1997) was just one of the wrong behaving leaders who reportedly looted the foreign aid
money for his own private interests and enjoyed his luxurious life for decades while droving the
people into poverty (Arvin 1998, 1; New York Times, June 22, 1997).7
Alternatively, the government officials and policy practitioners steal the aid and channel
the money to subsidize and fund their key industries or businesses, for which is not supposed to
go. A large portion of developmental aid in Pakistan was “re-appropriated” by the government
towards other projects where their political priorities, which leads to an inefficient aid allocation
(Rana and Koch 2020, 7-8). Khilji and Zampelli (1994) also found that the government in
Pakistan transferred US military and non-military assistance to fungible resources by showing
that private sectors absorbed 74% of the total aid. Even the remaining 26% went to another
public spending which was not planned to be allocated. In addition, during the late 1990s in

6

Those cases indicate that aid helps provide public goods of the recipient countries, which is ultimately conducive
to their economy. In fact, the average growth rate is 4.2% for India (the 1970s-1980s) and 6.4% for Indonesia (19661986) (World Bank).
7
In this case, the fungible usage of aid money reduces the effectiveness of aid on their national economy.
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Rwanda, the urban elites, including the military and political elites, took many development
projects, such as the reconstruction of Kigali airport (EU$ 5.5 million), maintaining roads
(EU$ 24 million), health and education, and justice reforms (EU$ 140 million) from EU aid, for
their private gains and benefits (Willum 2001, 111-112).
2.3.2. Fungibility and Political Usage
By bringing the fungibility of aid into the discussion, I explain the effectiveness of aid on growth
from the political economy perspective.8 That is, how and where to spend aid is a result of the
political leaders’ considerations, which reflects the power structure of the society. It is worth
mentioning that Easton (1965) already pointed out that foreign aid, in contrast to other types of
income, is deeply political because it is an authoritative allocation of values for a society. It is
important because it gives an insight into whether and how aid can ultimately promote or harm
the economy of the recipient countries. If a county uses all of the aid precisely as it is intended
for, the aid should help their economy, while if the country wastes all of them for other purposes,
the aid is not helpful to their economy. In other words, the degree or proportion of this fungible
usage of aid matters, making the difference of effectiveness on its economic growth.
2.3.3. Winning Coalition and Public versus Private Goods Provision
What motivates the fungible use of aid for political leaders, and to what extent do they spend the
money in this manner? I argue that each political leader faces different degrees of political
constraints and adopts different political and economic strategies to stay in power, and it makes
the difference on how and where to spend aid. In a society requiring inclusive support from their

“Political Economy Analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the
distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain, and
transform these relationships over time (OECD DAC, cited in DFID, 2009, 1).”
8
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people for political survival, the leader would spend the aid as public goods to secure the
support. In contrast, in a society relying on a small group of people, the leader would spend the
aid as private goods for their supporters. The rationale behind this argument is based on
selectorate theory.9
The fundamental assumption of the theory is that governments want to survive in office,
and the key strategy for this is to keep their supporters and reinforce their loyalty. To do so, the
survival-driven governments aim to convert some portion of the money and resources they have
to some forms of public goods or private goods or both and distribute them to their supporters.
The leaders always prefer using private goods to using public goods. However, the domestic
institutional characteristics constrain the choice (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Morrison
2009; Licht 2010).
For example, in the case of a small winning coalition, the government leader would like
to survive by providing them with private gains to keep the loyalty. Because the leader only
needs a small group of supporters to stay in power, it is easier and safer to give direct and private
benefits to their supporters.
On the other hand, in the case of a large winning coalition, the government leader would
like to survive by providing public goods to maintain the support from a large group of citizens.
It is more efficient than providing private goods because everyone in society can benefit from

9

The selectorate theory offers a simple but insightful account of how leaders gain and retain power. Bueno de
Mesquita et al. define a selectorate as “the set of people with a say in choosing leaders and with a prospect of
gaining access to special privileges doled out by leaders.” In order to secure their rule, leaders must maintain a
‘winning coalition.’ This coalition comprises the minimum group of people from within the selectorate whose
support is required to maintain power, given the prevailing rules and norms of a particular regime. Leaders maintain
their winning coalitions through the distribution of various 'goods,' broadly defined. Therefore, the size of the
winning coalition will dictate the strategies an actor will employ, given their desire to remain in power. Where the
form of the winning coalition shifts, so too will the strategy necessary to maintain it (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003).
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providing any unit of public goods without diminishing the enjoyment of others driven from the
same unit. The relative price of doing so falls compared to buying support with private goods
transfers, as the size of the coalition that the government leaders have to build to stay in power
increases (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).10 As a result of the necessity to provide better and
sufficient public goods, the governments with large winning coalitions are expected to
implement efficient public and economic policy (Kimball 2010).
The Degree of
Provision of
Public Goods

The Size of
Winning
Coalition

2.3.4. Historical and Empirical Evidence of Winning Coalition and Provision of Public Goods
Several historical cases are showing this practice, and one of the exemplar cases is Leopold II
(1835 – 1909), who was a king of Belgium (a large winning coalition) and ruler of the Congo
Free State (a small winning coalition). When Leopold II succeeded to the Belgian throne, the
Belgian depended on a reasonably large selectorate, which limited his political discretion power
and led to adopt many democratic institutions and policies in Belgium. During his reign, he
promoted universal adult male suffrage in free and competitive elections, extended public works
programs, reduced taxes on basic foodstuffs (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 323-333).
However, in ruling the Congo, where the winning coalition was minuscule, he relied only
on himself and turned his pull effort to generating private goods for himself and his supporters.
He showed no hint of benevolence to extract slave labor for producing ivory and rubber to

10

A similar logic can be found in international economic and trade policy literature on the concentrated interest
group versus dispersed public interest. Those studies found that trade policymakers tend to reflect the voice of the
concentrated interest groups better than the voice of the dispersed public interest, even though the size of the public
is much larger than that of the concentrated interest groups (See Heo and Horowitz 2001).
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become rich. In particular, as demand for rubber grows, Leopold imposed rubber quotas and
created Force Publique (a “police” force that was paid a low salary but augmented its wages
with commission) to meet the quota. The Force Publique was given unrestricted means,
including chopping off right hands, torture, and murder of slave labor. With this wild power,
they ended up killing at least ten million slaves. In that way, only Leopold and his supporters
became wealthy and virtually invested nothing to improve the country, unlike Belgium (Bueno
de Mesquita et al. 2003, 323-333).11
Empirically, Bell (2011) confirmed the theory by applying a panel data analysis for 15
public goods. The author found that leaders who must satisfy large winning coalitions increase
their allocation of government resources toward education, health, and welfare as their regimes
are consolidated. Then, it decreased as the winning coalitions become small. Recently, using
district-level data for Tanzania, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2017) also found that leaders in
the districts with small winning coalitions emphasized providing private goods such as cash
vouchers. In contrast, leaders in large winning coalition districts focused more on public goods
such as better health care access. Furthermore, using panel data for 155-180 countries from 1972
to 2007, McGuire (2013) showed that the winning coalition size is related to the infant mortality
rate. Based on the findings, he argued that the larger winning coalition is better for the citizens’

11

Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith (2004, 375) further illustrated and contrasted the more recent
examples of those two institutionally different cases. In the United Kingdom (a large winning coalition), the political
leaders pursued adopting certain policies and legislation for their winning coalition regardless of their political
preference. The members of the coalition received few and modest private benefits from it. Prime ministers of the
Conservative party, for example, tended to promote tax legislation that favors their core voters, while prime
ministers of the Labor party promoted welfare legislation. In contrast, in North Korea (a small winning coalition),
Kim Jong-il was just concerned to keep critical military leaders, close, loyal relatives, and essential bureaucrats
taking up somewhere between 250 and 2,500 out of 20 million citizens. Therefore, it is much easier for the leader to
distribute direct and private benefits for his core supporters to keep their loyalty and no need to provide public goods
to the ordinary people. According to the authors, the leader requires US$ 1.2 billion to sustain himself in the office
out of the approximately US$ 12 billion (North Korea's GDP), and each of the winning coalition members can
receive about US$ 500,000 where the income per capita is only around US$ 600.
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well-being because it makes the governments provide more public goods than the smaller
winning coalition.
These historical and empirical cases prove that the political leaders who are driven for
political survival act following the incentives created by the institutions they face. Their
behaviors are radically different in each society. The sizes of a society’s selectorate and winning
coalition influence the leaders’ decisions over where and how much spend government
resources. Leaders who rely on a large coalition emphasize providing public goods that enhance
social welfare, while those who rule with the support of a small group of cronies are less likely to
provide those goods. In sum, the winning coalition size matters in how governments allocate
their money and resources to keep their power, which has economic consequences. The larger
the winning coalition sizes, the more the leaders tend to provide public goods.
2.3.5. Foreign Aid, Winning Coalition, and Economic Growth
Those theoretical and empirical studies of the selectorate theory, particularly the winning
coalition and the provision of public goods, give the insight to explain the effectiveness of
foreign aid on economic growth in twofold: (1) foreign aid for political survival and (2) the
provision of public goods for economic growth.
2.3.5.1. Foreign Aid as a Resource of Political Survival
The primary concern for all government leaders is to keep their office, not to improve the wellbeing of the entire citizens sincerely. In this sense, aid is not necessarily helpful to develop the
economy and alleviate poverty unless they have to do it for their political survival (Bueno de
Mesquita and Root 2002). Thus, although donor countries and international society provide
foreign aid to help the recipient countries to promote the economic and social welfare of their
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citizens, the fungibility of aid allows the leaders and government officials to do just the opposite
for their own political interests (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). Aid, as an unearned and
freer income, increases the possibility of office holding and regime stability by spending the
money to provide rents and patronage to the members of their winning coalition (Ahmed 2012;
Nieto-Matiz and Schenoni 2018).
In large winning coalition societies, any newly coming and free incomes and resources,
including foreign aid, are turned toward providing additional public goods and services to shore
up the support and keep the office (Cao and Ward 2015). On the other hand, in small coalition
societies, many of these free resources are used by and for the leaders’ private goods. In this
case, those resources do not flow to public spending, and the political leaders predominately use
them as private rewards for their coalition members (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Licht
2010). That is, in small winning coalition societies, aid helps leaders increase the payoff to the
small group of crones while severely reducing the provision of public goods (Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2009).
Relatedly, Boon (1996) also found that the size of political elites matters for how a
recipient government spends foreign aid. To maximize their political survival, the political leader
uses distortionary financing power and transfers the aid money to their elites as private goods.
Thus, countries with a small size of political elites use foreign aid to increase private transfers to
the elites. In contrast, more representative and inclusive countries use aid to increase public
goods, which leads to lower taxes and higher investment and income.
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2.3.5.2. Public Goods and Economic Growth
The provision of efficient and sufficient public goods, which is one of the distinctive roles of a
government as well as the primary aim of foreign aid, has shown to be beneficial to their
economy (Clark, Poast, Flores, and Kaufman 2011; Taydas and Peksen 2012; Rahnama, Fawaz,
and Gittings 2017). In principle, the provision of public goods, such as access to safe drinking
water, sanitation, transport, medical care, and school, is essential for individual well-being
(Besley and Ghatak 2004). Accordingly, it improves the quality of the labor force and enhances
human capital stock, which eventually leads to the productive economic capacity of the county.
Moreover, providing public goods also stimulates private investment and capital inflow (Lucas
1988). For example, constructing economic and social infrastructure can attract foreign
investment and increase international transactions with the recipient countries by making them a
market-friendly environment, contributing to economic growth.
The Provision
of Public
Goods

Economic
Growth

There is ample empirical evidence of these positive roles of public goods on the
economy. For instance, ‘core infrastructure’ – streets, highways, airports, mass transit, and other
public capital – was proven to have the most explanatory power for private sector productivity in
the United States from 1949 to 1985 (Aschauer 1989). During 1970 and 1988, public investment
in transportation and communication in developing countries also led to higher economic growth
(Easterly and Rebelo 1993). Furthermore, Liu, Wang, Zhang, Li, Zhao, and Li (2017) showed a
significant positive correlation between investment in public goods and regional economic
development using the data of 31 provinces in China from 2007 to 2014. Similarly, the case of
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India also showed that the quality of public goods, such as quality of air, water, education, and
electricity, is closely associated with the level of income and human development (Singh 2015).
In sum, the empirical evidence confirms that the adequate provision of public goods is a
precondition for the essential quality of life, economic growth, and inclusive development.
Taken together, I argue that foreign aid, as not only an additional but also a less
accountable source of government revenue, is likely to reinforce the existing patterns of
government spending. Governments in the case of large winning coalitions are more likely to
spend it as public goods, while governments in the case of small winning coalitions are more
likely to spend it as private goods. The economic consequence is that foreign aid is more
effective for economic growth in the society of large winning coalitions because the money is
spent more as intended. On the other hand, it is less effective in the society of small winning
coalitions because it is spent more as private goods.
The Size of
Winning
Coalition

Economic
Growth

Foreign Aid

Based on the discussion, I hypothesize: the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is
conditional on the winning coalition size of the recipient governments. Specifically, as the size of
winning coalition increases, foreign aid leads to a higher economic growth rate.
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2.4. Empirical Analysis
2.4.1. Model Specification
The dependent variable in this study is economic growth measured by the percentage change of
gross domestic product (Growth). The main independent variables are foreign aid (ODA), the
size of winning coalition (WC), and its interaction term (ODA*WC). Particularly, the interaction
term is included to test the conditional effect of the size of winning coalition on the relationship
between foreign aid on economic growth, as the theoretical argument of this essay suggests. I
expect that the coefficient of the interaction term is positive because the size of winning coalition
increases aid effectiveness.
Then, I also included several control variables, which are significant determinants of
growth and utilized in many aid-growth studies (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Hansen and Tarp
2001; Collier 2007; Bangergee and Roy 2014; Wagner 2014; Mohapatra, Giri, and Seharawat
2016; Adeola 2017; Yonsi, Khemili, and Bechitini 2019): GDP per capita (GDP), gross fixed
capital formation (CF), population growth (PG), trade openness (TO), government expenditure
(GE), education attainment (EA), inflation (IF), and assassinations (AS).12
In specific, GDP per capita is included to capture the size of the economy. Gross fixed
capital formation is included to account for investment in physical capital. Population growth is
included as an indicator of the growth of the labor force. Trade openness is included to capture
the importance of international factors such as the use of advanced technologies among the
trading countries, thereby increases growth. Government expenditure is included to capture the
extent of public goods provided by the government. Education attainment is included as a proxy

12

These control variables are chosen based on a neoclassical growth model. The basic argument of this model is that
the economic growth of a country can be explained by looking at capital accumulation, labor or population growth,
and productivity improvement.
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for human capital. Inflation is included as a proxy for the stability of the macroeconomic and
business environment. Lastly, assassination is included to capture the political instability. Thus,
the model is constructed as follows:
Growthit = β0 + β1lnODAit + β2WCit + β3lnODAit*WCit + β4lnGDPit + β5lnGCit + β6lnCFit
+ β7PGit + β8lnIFit + β9TOit + β10EAit + β11ASit + μi + υt + εit (1)
Where ln denotes variables in natural logs. β0 is constant terms. μi represents the country-specific
effects. υt represents the time effects. εit represents the error term. In addition, the dataset
covered all of the eligible aid-recipient countries over time (i.e., panel dataset), and the variables
are indexed countries by i and years by t.
The description of the variables used in this study is below:
Growthit = economic growth rate as measured by GDP growth rate (%)
ODAit = the official development assistance (ODA, disbursement) share of GDP (%)13
WCit = the size of the winning coalition as measured by 5 scales, ranging from 0 to 1, by
0.2514

13

Concerning how to measure aid, there are some options: the raw value of aid, aid/population, and aid/GDP.
However, this study used aid/GDP for the following reasons. First, raw values are not informative due to differences
in income and population between countries. One option is to scale total and received by a given country (one time)
by its population size, suggesting per capita and as the “treatment” variable of interest. This is an intuitive measure
and is technically appealing as many intermediate outcomes are expressed in population terms (e.g., average years of
schooling, life expectancy). Nevertheless, aid/population has specific limitations compared to aid to GDP
(aid/GDP), which has been more commonly used in the literature to date. First, it is hard to give a sensible or
straightforward interpretation to any estimated effect of aid per capita on key macroeconomic outcomes, where
variables are often measured in terms of or scaled by GDP. For instance, suppose we find that an inflow of US$ 10
of aid per capita causes the GDP growth rate to rise by one percentage point. Although this may be of interest per se,
the problem is that the implied benefit-cost ratio is ambiguous because it depends on the initial size of the economy.
Second, it is reasonable to assume that the actual cost of providing a given flow of public services, such as
education, tends to increase with GDP. Thus, especially over extended time frames, the relative purchasing power of
aid over a wide range of outcomes is best considered in economic terms, not population terms (Arndt, Jones, and
Tarp 2015, 9).
14
The size of the winning coalition, WC, is measured as described in The Logic of Political Survival (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003). WC ranges from 0 (smallest winning coalition) to 1 (largest winning coalition), and it consists
of four components, each being worth 0.25 of the aggregate score. 0.25 is added to WC for each of the following
conditions: (i) the regime is neither a “military” nor a “civilian-militarty” regime as coded by Banks (2007); (ii)
candidates for executive office are chosen via dual executive election or open election (Polity IV “xropen” > 2); (iii)
executives are chosen via competitive elections (Polity IV “xrcomp” > = 2); and (iv) elections are typified by free
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GDPit = total amount of GDP per capita
GCit = total amount of government consumption expenditure
CFit = the domestic gross capital formation share of GDP (%)
PGit = population growth rate (%)
IFit = inflation rate (%)
TOit = trade openness as measured by the total amount of import and export share of
GDP (%)
EAit = education attainment as measured by the average years of total schooling
ASit = the number of assassination

2.4.2. Data
The dataset is constructed as a panel structure with country-year observations for 82 aid-recipient
countries covering 1960 and 2010. Most of the economic variables – Growth (GDP growth,
annual %), GDP (per capita), Government Consumption (government consumption expenditure),
Capital Formation (gross capital formation, % of GDP), Population growth (annual %), Inflation
(annual %), Trade Openness (calculated using exports and imports data, % of GDP) were taken
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Data on ODA were obtained
from OECD statistics (measuring total receipts by country, disbursement). Data on the size of
winning coalition were obtained from Banks (2008) and Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010)
(regime type) and Polity IV dataset (elections). Lastly, data on education attainment (average
years of total schooling) were taken from Barro and Lee (2018), and data on assassinations were
from Bordea, Elbadawi, and Houle (2017), respectively. The descriptive statistics of the
variables studied in this analysis were presented in Table 1.

and noncoerced competition of regularly active political groups (Polity IV “parcomp” = 5). More information about
these components is available in Banks (2007) and Marshall and Jaggers (2002).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES
Mean
SD
Growth (%)
4.109
7.221
ODA (% GDP)
7.713
64.49
Winning Coalition
0.456
0.257
GDP (per capita)
5,757
10,589
Government Consumption
1.373e+10 3.924e+10
Capital Formation
22.84
11.44
Population Growth (%)
2.113
1.592
Inflation (%)
39.44
530.8
Trade Openness
78.23
51.76
Education Attainment
4.809
2.768
Assassination
0.208
1.039
Log ODA (% GDP)
0.856
1.613
Log GDP (per capita)
7.768
1.299
Log Government Consumption
21.66
1.904
Log Capital Formation
3.033
0.468
Log Inflation (%)
1.901
1.339
Log Trade Openness
4.165
0.684

Min
-64.05
-592.9
0
115.8
730,983
-5.740
-10.96
-35.84
0
0.0400
0
-8.705
4.752
13.50
-1.228
-4.191
-3.863

Max
150.0
2,796
1
114,161
7.820e+11
219.1
17.70
24,411
531.7
12.32
26
7.936
11.65
27.39
5.389
10.10
6.276

2.4.3. Methods
The dependent variable is ‘dynamic’ – that is, the past realization of dependent variables might
also affect current year performance. For example, it may not be the current year’s foreign aid
that affects economic growth, but rather the previous year’s aid could play a significant role in
economic growth. Thus, to capture this characteristic of the panel dataset, I have employed the
GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimation technique, which Arellano and Bond (1991)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed.15 This GMM technique uses lags of the dependent

15

Arellano and Bond (1991) firstly proposed using the difference GMM estimation. This estimator removes the
fixed effects by transforming the data and uses lagged values of the dependant variables as instruments to addresses
the endogeneity issue. In a later study, Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that the difference GMM performs poorly,
especially when the variables are close to a random walk - the lagged levels are not solid instruments for first
differenced variables. Moreover, when the number of time periods is small and the dependent variable is highly
persistent, the difference GMM may cause the sample bias (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano 1999). The system-GMM
estimator improved the efficiency by using both lagged levels as well as lagged differences and system-GMM
estimators to ascertain the robustness of the results. Also, in the system GMM, time-invariant variables can be
considered regressors such as distance and common religion in the model.
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variables as explanatory variables, and the lagged values of the dependent variables serve as
instruments to control this endogenous relationship. By doing so, GMM estimators can provide
consistent results in the presence of various sources of endogeneity, “unobserved heterogeneity,
simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity (Wintoki, Linck, and Netter 2012, 588).”16 For this
reason, I applied the two-step system GMM estimation as the most reliable one in dealing with
these sources of endogeneity in addition to the one-step system GMM.17
In order to model the dynamics of aid-growth relations and account for persistence in
growth rate, one year lagged dependent variable is included as an additional independent variable
and is used as the instrument. Accordingly, the final model specification for this dynamic dataset
is given by:
Growthit = β0 + θGrowthit-1 + β1lnODAit + β2WCit + β3lnODAit*WCit + β4lnGDPit + β5lnGCit +
β6lnCFit + β7PGit + β8lnIFit + β9TOit + β10EAit + β11ASit + μi + υt + εit’ (2)
Growthjt-1 represents the growth rate of country j in period t-1, and all of the other variables are
the same as described in equation (1).

“There are two kinds of the methods, known as one-step GMM and two-step GMM, depending on how to
transform the data (which means a statistical process where a variable's past value is subtracted from its present
value, Roodman 2009, 86). However, one-step GMM, which uses the first-difference transformation, has some
limitations. For instance, if a variable's current value is missing, then the first-difference transformation could result
in the loss of too many observations (Roodman 2009). To avoid this potential data loss, Arellano and Bover (1995)
recommended the use of a second-order transformation (two-step GMM). This two-step GMM subtracts the average
of all future available observations of a particular variable instead (Roodman 2009, 86). Using a two-step GMM,
researchers can prevent unnecessary data loss, so that in the case of a balanced panel dataset, a two-step GMM
model provides more efficient and consistent estimates for the involved coefficients (Arellano and Bover 1995)
(Ullah, Akhtar, and Zaefarian 2018, 71).”
17
The problem may be addressed using instrumental variables. However, finding proper instrumental variables is
complicated and sometimes impossible (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, and Lalive, 2010; Antonakis and House,
2014). The fundamental problem of the instrumental variable approach is the identification of the models due to the
high complications such as not having sufficient data, high correlations of instrumental variables, and deficient order
and rank conditions (Bentler and Chou 1987; Martens and Haase 2006). Also, researchers should have solid
theoretical arguments to build the directions of hypotheses and models for using specific instrumental variables.
16
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Concerning the robustness check of the estimation technique for the empirical test, I
implemented other techniques as well: OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with PCSE (Panel
Corrected Standard Error), random and fixed effect analysis. The results of these estimations are
also presented in the following results sections.

2.5. Results and Discussion
The results are presented in Table 2: OLS with PCSE, Random and Fixed effect,18one-step and
two-step system GMM. First, aid (ODA (% GDP) (log)) itself has a negative and statistically
significant effect. Meanwhile, the winning coalition’s size has no significant effect on economic
growth across all of the model specifications. More importantly, the interaction between those
two variables (ODA*WC), which is the main theoretical concern of this paper,19 is also positive
and statistically significant across all of the columns: the coefficients lie in a range from 0.74 to
2.25.20 This result implies that for the short term, the conditionality of foreign aid and the size of
the winning coalition together makes the difference in the effectiveness of the recipients’
economic growth. Specifically, a one-unit increase in the size of winning coalition (for a given
level of aid) enhances the positive impact of ODA on growth. In other words, the bigger

18

Concerning the appropriateness of using fixed-effect over random-effect dealing with unobserved heterogeneity in
the panel dataset, this paper performed the Hausman test. The result (p < 0.000) implies that using fixed-effect is
preferable because some individual characteristics in the panel dataset do not change over time, affecting the
dependent variable.
19
My theoretical prediction on the conditional effect of winning coalition size is that with increasing winning
coalition size, the recipient government is more likely to spend foreign aid as public goods, which I assume to be
beneficial to the economic growth. In other words, foreign aid is more likely to help the economy, that is, to achieve
a higher economic growth rate in countries with larger sizes of winning coalitions.
20
Also, it is important to point out that when the interaction term is disordinal and statistically significant, the main
effects (here, foreign aid and the size of winning coalition) are not interpretable and misleading, unlike the case of
ordinal interaction (ordinal interactions have lines with different slopes but they do not cross, while disordinal
interactions have lines which cross each other).
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coalition size has a facilitating effect of aid on a country’s economic growth, other things are
being equal.
These empirical results support the theoretical expectation, in general. There is a
conditional effect of foreign aid and winning coalition on economic growth. The effect of foreign
aid on economic growth is different depending on the winning coalition sizes. However, it is
hard to get a realistic picture of the conditional effects simply by looking at the coefficients and
standard errors of the interaction term. Testing hypotheses of interaction often emphasizes
visually depicting the marginal effect of one lower-order variable at different values of the other
lower-order variable in order to assess whether the marginal effect is statistically significant
(Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Kam and Franzese 2007). In models with interaction terms, it
is also well known that the marginal effect and the associated standard errors vary with the value
of the other lower-order variable (Friedrich 1982; Braumoeller 2004).
Table 2.2: Foreign Aid, the Size of Winning Coalition, and Economic Growth

Growth t-1
ODA (% GDP) (log)
Winning Coalition
ODA*WC
GDP per capita (log)
Gov’t. Consumption
(log)
Capital Formation (log)

(1)
OLS
(PCSE)

(2)
Random
Effect

(3)
Fixed
Effect

-

-

-

-0.704**
(0.274)
-0.429
(0.569)
0.737*
(0.395)
-0.371
(0.256)
-0.058
(0128)
2.812***

-0.693***
(0.196)
0.102
(0.563)
0.759**
(0.297)
-0.266
(0.236)
-0.223*
(0.133)
2.952***

-0.598***
(0.216)
0.208
(0.654)
0.992***
(0.315)
1.125**
(0.570)
-1.892***
(0.340)
2.735***
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(4)
One-step
System
GMM
0.138***
(0.0459)
-1.533***
(0.376)
0.161
(1.435)
2.248***
(0.563)
-0.315
(1.321)
-1.230
(0.742)
4.083***

(5)
Two-step
System
GMM
0.116
(0.0741)
-1.133**
(0.554)
-0.227
(1.763)
1.845**
(0.780)
-0.336
(1.717)
-0.620
(1.068)
3.087***

Population Growth (%)
Inflation (log) (%)
Trade Openness (log)
Education Attainment
Assassination
Constant
Number of Observation
R2
Number of Country
Number of Instrument
AR(1)
AR(2)
Sargan Test

(0.348)
(0.344)
(0.392)
0.369**
0.409***
0.468***
(0.150)
(0.141)
(0.163)
-0.414*** -0.492*** -0.490***
(0.096)
(0.0832)
(0.0892)
0.597**
0.799**
2.091***
(0.260)
(0.342)
(0.479)
-0.039
-0.128
-0.112
(0.090)
(0.0855)
(0.131)
0.029
-0.0501
-0.00814
(0.0548)
(0.0747)
(0.0752)
-2.055
0.145
20.91***
(2.035)
(2.805)
(5.859)
2,084
2,084
2,084
0.142
0.085
0.102
82
82
82
Standard errors in parentheses

(0.784)
-0.902*
(0.521)
-0.658***
(0.159)
3.208**
(1.305)
0.231
(0.424)
-0.0147
(0.149)
13.13
(12.23)
2,063
82
84
0.000
0.669
1611.930

(1.057)
-0.898
(0.783)
-0.698***
(0.242)
3.766**
(1.865)
0.0413
(0.652)
0.00488
(0.100)
0.00
(0.00)
2,063
82
84
0.000
0.848
1611.930

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Thus, this work proceeded to investigate the marginal effect and presented several plots,
mainly based on the estimations of the two-step system GMM estimator (Column (5)) for the
following reasons. First, given the growth persistency, it is more appropriate to rely on the
dynamic models (equation (2)), which GMM estimators (Column (4) and (5)) can deal with. In
addition, these GMM estimators better account for the other possible endogeneity issues of aidgrowth relation,21 which satisfies the conditions for the estimators’ validity: Sargan test and
Arellano-Bond test for the first-order and second-order correlation.22 Figure 1, 2, and 3

21

That, not only aid can influence economic growth, but also economic growth can influence aid. For example, the
rapidly growing economy may decrease the inflow of aid, or the staggering economy may increase the need for aid.
22
When applying the GMM model, researchers need to implement two post-estimation tests to ensure that an
appropriate econometric model is applied. These tests are (1) the Sargan test and (2) the Arellano-Bond test for the
first-order and second-order correlation. First, a critical assumption for the validity of GMM estimates requires that
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visualized these conditional effects of foreign aid and the winning coalition’s size on economic
growth.
First, Figure 2 presents the average marginal effects of ODA across the winning
coalition’s size on economic growth. The average ODA effect becomes positive as the winning
coalition’s size becomes larger, holding other variables at the same value, which is in the
predicted direction although marginally significant.23 Specifically, when the size of winning
coalition is 0, the average marginal effect of ODA is –1.04 (p = 0.07), while when the size is 1,
the effect is 0.72 (p = 0.06). Since only the difference is the size of winning coalition, it should
be the cause of the difference in the growth rate. In other words, compared to two countries who
received the same (average) amount of aid, the county in the case of a larger winning coalition
has a better economic outcome than the country in a smaller winning coalition.

instruments are exogenous. In other words, the findings from GMM will not be valid if the instruments are
endogenously determined. Sargan test is used to determine whether the econometric model is valid or not and
whether the instruments are correctly specified or not. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the researcher needs to
reconsider the model or the instruments used in the estimation process. On the other hand, if the Sargan test turns
out to be insignificant, it implies that the instruments included in the econometric specifications are exogenous.
Second, to examine the validity of a strong exogeneity assumption, the Arellano-Bond test for no auto-correlation
(or no serial correlation) is used under the null hypothesis that the error terms for two different periods are
uncorrelated. In other words, it means that the lagged variables are not correlated with the error term (Ullah, Akhtar,
and Zaefarian 2018, 76). The values for these two post-estimation tests are reported in Table 2, which confirm that
the instruments used in this estimation process are valid.
23
Although both p-values cannot reject the null hypotheses at 0.05 level, which is the conventional wisdom in many
social science disciplines, the result shows the predicted direction, and there could be some effects of it. Thus, it is
worth further investigating (Johnson 2019).
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Figure 2.2: Average Marginal Effects of ODA
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On the other hand, the amount of aid inflows into the recipients varies across countries
and over time. Figure 3 and 4 show the predictive margins to depict the scenarios. For example,
Figure 3 allows comparing the effect of different amounts (at the maximum and minimum) of aid
across the size of winning coalition. In specific, as the theoretical argument expects, it shows that
the effect of winning coalition on economic growth becomes statistically significant and positive
when the amount of aid is large (ODA (log) = 7, red line). In other words, the effect is amplified
as the size of winning coalition becomes larger, when the country receives a relatively large
amount of aid. The marginal effects move from -2.34 (p = 0.55) to 9.61 (p < 0.01) as the size of
winning coalition moves from 0 to 1 and the effect is more noticeable in the range of the winning
coalition from 0.5 (3.63, p = 0.05), 0.75 (6.62, p < 0.01) to 1 (9.61, p < 0.01).
Similarly, Figure 4 presents the effect of the size of winning coalition across the various
amount of ODA. It further shows that even when the amount of aid is at modicum level (at 2, 4,
and 6), the different sizes of winning coalition work as predicted. As moving from the lower
values (0 and 0.25) to the higher values of the size of winning coalition (1 and 0.75, red line), the
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relationship is turned to be positive, as indicated by the upward slope lines, and statistically
significant. For example, although both countries receive the same amount of 2, 4, or 6 (ODA
(log)), one country in the case of large winning coalition (1) is expected to have larger and
significant marginal effect (6.2, p < 0.01 at 2, 7.7, p < 0.01 at 4, 9.37, p < 0.01 at 6) than the
other (2.5, p = 0.06 at 2, 0.45, p = 0.85 at 4, -1.68, p = 0.62 at 6).24 Overall, these plots
graphically showed that where relatively large winning coalitions, foreign aid is positively
associated with its economic growth.
Figure 2.3: Predictive Margins of Growth for the Size of Winning Coalition Conditional on
Foreign Aid
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These results discovered an interesting pattern, although it is not theoretically guided and expected. When a
country receives a relatively small amount of ODA (-8, blue line in Figure 3 and comparison between red and blue
line in Figure 4), the effect of the winning coalition size becomes the opposite. As the size of the winning coalition
becomes smaller, the marginal effect becomes positive and statistically significant. It goes from -1.23 (p = 0.71) at 1
to 13.19 (p < 0.01) at 0. Similar patterns are shown in Figure 3 as well. For example, the difference of marginal
effect between the coalition size effect of 0 and 1 at -8 ODA (log) is 14 (when the winning coalition is 0, the effect
is 13 (p < 0.01), while it is 1, the effect is -.1.63 (p=0.63) and that of effect at -4 ODA (log) is 7 (when the winning
coalition is 0, the effect is 9.01 (p < 0.01), while it is 1, the effect is 1.51 (p=0.43).
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Figure 2.4: Predictive Margins of Growth for Foreign Aid Conditional on the Size of Winning
Coalition
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
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As an additional empirical analysis, the long-run impact of the conditional effect was
calculated using the coefficient of the GMM estimator (this coefficient is only interpreted as the
short-term effect with one year lag of the dependent variable). The result is 2.08 (p = 0.025)25
and it indicates that a one-unit of change of the interaction terms is associated with 2.08%
increases in growth rate in the long run at 5% significant level, on average, other things are being
equal. Indeed, the interaction effect of aid and the winning coalition has even a more
considerable impact on its economic growth in the long run (2.08) than in the short run (1.85).
Concerning the control variables, several conditions robustly show their impact on
economic growth across the estimators. Domestic capital and trade openness are significantly

25

This long-run effect of GMM estimator result is calculated according to the following formula:

̂
β
p

1−∑
j=1

̂j
ϕ

, where

β denotes the coefficients for the variable log ODA*WC, p stands for the number of lags included into the model,
and ϕ denotes the coefficients for the variable lag growth (see Zuazu-Bermejo 2015, 12).
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positive, while inflation is significantly negative on economic growth. On the other hand,
education attainment and assassination do not show any statistical significance.
In sum, these empirical results provided evidence for the theoretical expectation of the
conditional (or moderating) effect of aid and the size of winning coalition on economic growth.
In the case of the large winning coalition size, the recipient government is more likely to spend
foreign aid as public goods, which is beneficial for economic growth. In addition, the finding that
the effect of this conditional effect becomes more prominent for the long term adds some
confidence to the argument that the effect of foreign aid goes through providing public goods
such as social and economic infrastructure and human capital, which takes time into effect.

2.6. Conclusion
In this essay, I presented a theoretical argument on the aid-growth nexus in a political economy
perspective that focuses on the incentive and strategies of the leaders of the recipient countries
for their political survival. I argued that the effectiveness of aid on economic growth depends on
how to spend the money. The same amount of foreign aid to two different countries can have
completely different results because aid in one country goes where it is supposed to be, while aid
in another country may not be used for the intended purpose. These different spending of aid
comes from the political leaders’ survival strategy. In particular, to maximize the chance to stay
in office, governments in the case of a large winning coalition spend the aid money as it is
intended for: the provision of public goods, which helps the economy. In contrast, in the case of
a small winning coalition, governments spend money on private goods and wasted; thus, aid is
less effective on growth.

38

This theoretical argument is empirically tested with a panel dataset, 82 countries for the
period between 1965 and 2010. Based on the neoclassical growth model and utilizing the GMM
estimation method, this essay found evidence that supports the theoretical prediction. First, the
interaction effect of foreign aid and the winning coalition showed positive and statistically
significant. The effectiveness of foreign aid on economic growth is conditional on the size of
winning coalition. Specifically, the effect of foreign aid becomes positive as the winning
coalition’s size becomes large. When the size of winning coalition is 0, the average marginal
effect of the log ODA is –1.04 (p = 0.07), while when the size is 1, the effect is 0.72 (p = 0.06).
Furthermore, the interaction effect of aid and the winning coalition has a more considerable
impact on its economic growth in the long run (2.08) than in the short run (1.85).
These theoretical arguments and empirical findings suggest some policy directions and
recommendations to foreign aid policymakers and practitioners. One crucial fact is that donors
and international agencies should be aware of the diverse recipient countries’ political
environments, which affect the aid practices and their effectiveness. As this study showed, more
inclusive and representative societies tend to have better aid practice and implementation and
better economic performance. On the other hand, more exclusive and elite-centric societies tend
to use and waste the money for their private interests, and, in turn, aid is less effective. This
different aid effectiveness could partly explain why many people living in these countries still
suffer extreme poverty even with a large amount of foreign aid. The large inflow of foreign
assistance to African countries has not served its key purpose due to the poor governance and
chronic social disease such as political patronage and corruption prevailing (Abuzeid 2009;
Moyo and Mafuso 2017). Such a point is an important contribution of this study. Many
developing countries are lagged concerning their institutional development, which should be one
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of the main concerns for donors and international organizations when making aid policy
decisions.
In specific, it implies that aid policymakers should avoid adopting a homogeneous aid
allocation policy for all countries as much as possible. It is not to say aid organizations should
abandon aid policy itself altogether but improve the nature of aid provision in countries in need.
That is, careful analysis and evaluation should be geared towards finding when, where, and how
aid takes place as this study found, for example, the winning coalition size affecting where the
aid money goes. Second, the donor countries and international organizations should closely
monitor and implement the correct allocation policies to see positive results when the money
goes to poor governance and small and strong elites governing countries. It makes practical sense
since aid is likely to be wasted if the channels are inefficient and ineffective.
Finally, some weaknesses of this study also need to be addressed. Concerning the
research methods, this study was only able to show evidence of the conditional effect of foreign
aid and the size of winning coalition on economic growth, not the relationship between foreign
aid, winning coalition, and public goods provision. Thus, it would be better to empirically
examine the conditional effect of foreign aid and the winning coalition on the government’s
provision of public goods (or private goods) first, and then, its effect on the economic growth of
the recipient countries to support the theoretical argument more confidently. However, it remains
as a difficult task to differentiate public and private goods in a practical sense and find and get
the proper indicators of those goods to measure, especially for developing countries for now.
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Chapter 3. Foreign Aid, Economic Growth, and Political Violence

3.1. Introduction
Does foreign aid deter violence in recipient countries? Political violence and conflict threaten the
health and safety of millions of people around the world. Extremist terrorist groups such as ISIS
in Iraq, FARC in Colombia, and Al-Shabaab in East Africa attack the governments and victimize
local people. In Southeast Asia, the clashes between Buddhist-Muslim often threaten the citizens
and lead governments to declare a state of emergency (Grady 2017, 1). The instability from these
violent incidences prevents not only economic and social development in those regions but also
undermines international peace. As a result, the prevention of political violence has been one of
the top priorities of foreign aid. Hundreds of dollars annually are spent on aid programs hoping
that those assistances prevent the violence, contribute to the well-being of the people in the
recipient countries, and ultimately achieve global peace.
However, the existing empirical studies on the aid-conflict nexus showed mixed findings.
Some found that aid help to prevent political violence in the recipient countries and insisted that
it is because aid increases government capacity and capability to control the potential rebels
(Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2002; Azam and Thelen 2008; 2010;
Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas 2011, 2014). On the other hand, others found that aid
inflow causes violence in the recipient countries and claimed that it is because aid gives more
incentives for the rebellions to initiate the conflict (Grossman 1992; Azam 1995; Gershenson and
Grossman 2000; Arcand and Chauvet 2001).
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This essay also investigated the effectiveness of foreign aid on violence by arguing that
foreign aid can help to mitigate the recipient country’s political violence via its role in economic
growth. In specific, I claim that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is more prominent
in a society where the political leader needs a broad set of winning coalition. Then, the growing
national economy with the help of aid, in turn, strengthens the government and weakens the
potential rebels, which ultimately leads to fewer political conflicts. To test the theoretical
argument, I collected data on the aid recipient countries and empirically examined the
relationships among foreign aid, winning coalition, economic growth, civil wars, and domestic
terrorism by utilizing a moderated mediation model.
By doing so, this essay contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, I clearly
articulated the recipient countries’ economic well-being, the primary purpose of foreign aid, as
the mediating mechanism on their political violence, rather than the direct mechanism, which the
existing literature has focused on. Second, by applying a mediated moderation model, I was able
to show that the two causal processes from foreign aid and winning coalition to economic growth
and from the growth to political violence are empirically significant and related to each other.
The rest of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews several pieces of relevant
literature on the effectiveness of foreign on political violence. In section 3, I elaborate on the
theoretical reasoning of this essay, the effect of foreign aid on political violence via its role on
economic growth, which is conditional on the size of the winning coalition. Section 4 presents
model specification, data, and method for its empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the findings
and discusses the implication. Section 6 concludes.
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3.2. Literature Review: Foreign Aid and Political Violence
The existing studies investigating the effectiveness of foreign aid on political violence have
mainly focused on the direct mechanism of aid on violence: aid inflow directly changes the
ability and willingness of governments and potential rebels to the conflict. Depending on which
party they focus on, one group of scholars argues that foreign aid mitigates the likelihood of
political violence because the money can strengthen the government’s capacity to control the
society and discourage potential rebels. The other group of scholars claims that aid has no effect
on or even increases the risk of political violence because it can provide more incentive for the
potential rebels to steal the money and resources by triggering the conflict. As both perspectives
seem theoretically plausible, do the empirical analyses have shown mixed results.
3.2.1. Foreign Aid and Decrease in Political Violence
Some studies advocate foreign aid and argue that the aid can be spent directly to increase the
resources of the recipient governments and enhance their ability to fight the potential
challengers; thus, it reduces the risk of political violence (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and
Dollar 2002; Azam and Thelen 2008; 2010; Bandyopadhyay et al. 2011, 2014). For example,
foreign aid can be spent to increase the governments’ military and security capacity, which
makes it easier for them to detect and target their potential rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler
2002; 2007). In specific, aid inflows increase the government revenue and allow more spending
on counterinsurgent activity such as buying weapons and training security officials, which can
improve the ability and capacity of the governments to control the society and potential violence
against them (Gurr and Moore 1997; Gurr 2000; Ezeurra and Manotas 2013).
In fact, this belief provided the rationale for many countries and international
organizations to intervene with financial assistance in the ongoing conflict areas such as Yemen,
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Pakistan, Colombia, Somalia, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (World Bank
2012; Holmer, Bauman, and Aryaeinejad 2018; Pandith 2019). In addition, billions of aid dollars
have been spent in Afghanistan and Iraq to strengthen the governments and settle the enduring
conflicts (Sopko 2013; Department of the Army 2014).
Moreover, foreign aid can help the governments to gain popularity from their citizens.
Governments can directly distribute the aid money to their citizens, persuade them to resist
insurgent appeals, and support the government’s counterinsurgency efforts. Similarly, aid can be
used to encourage pro-government attitudes and reduce a rebel organization’s attractiveness for
new and potential recruits and resources (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Lyall, Shiraito, and
Imai 2015; Sexton 2016).
Empirically, Savun and Tirone (2011) provided evidence that aid helps recipient
countries to avoid civil war. They examined all developmental aid eligible countries from 1990
to 2003. They showed that countries receiving high levels of aid to promote democracy are less
likely to experience civil war than those who lack such support. Nielson et al. (2011) also
investigated how aid can affect the likelihood of violent armed conflict in recipient countries
during 1981-2005. They found that sudden drops in foreign aid significantly increase the
likelihood of the onset of civil war, although the sudden surge of it has no apparent effect.
Examining the sub-Saharan Africa region, De Ree and Nillesen (2009) also showed that foreign
aid inflows reduce the duration of civil war in the region. Based on the findings, then they
reasoned that it is possible because of the increased government capacity.
Several studies also examined the effectiveness of foreign aid on terrorist attacks. For
example, Azam and Thelen (2008) showed that the level of foreign aid is negatively related to
the number of terrorist attacks by the nationals of recipient countries, as does the recipient
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country’s level of education. Later, Young and Findley (2011) specifically found that aid
targeted to promote education, health, and civil society effectively dampens terrorist activities.
Likewise, Savun and Tirone (2018) argued that aid for governance and civil society could
discourage participation and support in terrorist activity by improving the country’s political
conditions. Examining the aid-eligible countries from 1997 to 2010, they found that countries
receiving a large amount of governance and civil society aid experienced fewer domestic
terrorist incidents than countries receiving little or none.
In sum, these studies emphasized that aid inflows increase the recipient government
revenue, and the governments directly use the money and resources for counterinsurgent efforts.
Moreover, they provided empirical evidence that aid reduces the possibility of political conflicts
such as civil wars and terrorist attacks in recipient countries.
3.2.2. Foreign Aid and Increase in Political Violence
Alternatively, other scholars offer a more pessimistic perspective by emphasizing the role of
foreign aid on the potential rebels, which increases the risk of political conflict (Grossman 1992;
Azam 1995; Gershenson and Grossman 2000; Arcand and Chauvet 2001). According to them,
aid leads to a higher probability of conflict since it increases the incentives and potential payoffs
when opportunistic rebellions succeed in controlling the government. The recipient countries are
often poor and have few resources, and rebels have little to gain by capturing the government.
However, the inflow of foreign aid changes the calculus and increases the attractiveness of
political violence to take over the governments.
Grossman (1992) analyzed the allocative and distributive effects of foreign aid on its
insurrections. He found that foreign aid indeed increases the reward associated with capturing
state as well as rent-seeking incentives for the potential rebels, which eventually leads to
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conflicts. In this regard, aid volatility also plays a vital role in explaining its potentially
destabilizing effect. For instance, Arcand and Chauver (2001) found that the volatile aid inflows
increase the risk of conflict since the volatility leads to higher uncertainty, fostering instability.
Similarly, Nielsen et al. (2011) showed that a sudden decrease of aid inflow (e.g., negative aid
shocks) causes the government’s credibility problem to their opponent and increases the
possibility of political conflict.
Knack (2001) empirically supported the argument that aid increases political violence. By
investigating panel data between 1982 and 1995, the author found that both, higher levels of
development aid as a percentage of GNP and total development aid as a percentage of
government expenditures, decrease the quality of governance. Based on the finding, the author
argued that aid inflow facilitates its political insurgency because it undermines the quality of
governance in recipient countries. Relatedly, Zürcher (2017), in his review article, evaluated the
relationship between development aid and civil war and articulated three main findings; (1) In
most of the cases, aid was not effective in reducing conflict; (2) Aid was only effective in some
areas that had already been stabilized from the conflicts; (3) Aid was even exacerbated in some
areas where the money was misappropriated by violent rebel groups or when the rebels disrupted
the cooperation between the local population and the government during aid projects.
Recently, Mousseau (2020) examined 147 countries between 1961 and 2008 and two
case studies on Iraq and Sri Lanka and found evidence that a higher level of developmental aid
increases the likelihood of ethnic war. Nielsen et al. (2011) also studied how foreign aid affects
armed conflict using bilateral and multilateral aid data from 1981 to 2005. They found that in
addition to aid inflows, aid shocks (severe decreases in aid revenues) also increase the
probability of the onset of violent armed conflict.
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Similarly, Nasr, Rehman, and Orakzai (2012) argued that foreign assistance is
unnecessary to reduce terrorist attacks in recipient countries by providing evidence of Pakistan’s
experience. In fact, they found that during the period of war on terror (1972 – 2010), Pakistan
experienced more terrorist incidents, as the amount of foreign aid had increased. Investigating
the panel data of 122 countries from 1970 to 2005, Danzell, Kisangani, and Pickering (2019) also
confirmed that the level of foreign aid is positively associated with all of the three indicators the number of terrorist incidents, fatalities, and causalities.
In brief, the second group of scholars showed that foreign aid does not secure
governments from conflicts and even exacerbates the risk. According to them, foreign aid
increases the potential payoffs of the rebels to initiate political conflict when they succeed in
destabilizing society and seize power.
These existing studies have advanced our understanding of the effectiveness of foreign
aid, especially emphasizing the direct mechanism of foreign aid on political conflicts. The
money can play a role in either strengthening the government’s capacity to detect and fight
against the potential rebels or increasing the incentive of the rebels and triggering political
violence to capture the money. Although aid could affect conflicts in both ways, they seem to
pay less attention to other main mechanisms: economic growth, which is the primary purpose of
foreign aid. I attempt to fill the gap by arguing that aid can reduce political conflict when and if it
helps the recipient country’s economy. The following section provides the theoretical reasoning
in detail.
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3.3. Theory: Foreign Aid, Economic Growth, and Political Violence
Not all foreign aid contributes to the national economy of the recipients, even though it increases
the government budget and resources of the recipients. It is because the aid comes to the country
as fungible and unearned income. The political leaders often spend the money to help their
survival and interests, that is, to keep and ensure their existing supporters. Specifically, where the
leader needs a broad set of people to stay in power, it is more efficient for them to provide public
goods and policy. In contrast, where the leader only needs a small fraction of the society, it is
easier for them to provide direct and private goods and benefits to the core supporters. The
implication of these different ways of aid spending on growth is that the more they spend the aid
to provide public goods, the more effective it is on their economy. The growing economy, in
turn, reduces the possibility of political violence. It is because the government can increase its
capacity to fight against the potential violence, citizens tend to approve and support the current
government, and the potential rebels lose their power and cause to initiate conflict.
Figure 3.1: Theoretical Framework

The Size of
Winning
Coalition

Economic
Growth

Political
Conflict

Foreign Aid

Figure 1 depicts this theoretical relationship. It shows when aid matters on the economic
performance: aid is carried out under the various sizes of winning coalition, which affects its
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economic performance (moderation effect). It also shows how aid matters in political conflict: as
long as foreign aid contributes to economic growth, it negatively affects political conflict
(mediation effect). Overall, aid reduces the probability of political conflict when it helps the
economic growth of the recipient country, which is more likely to occur in the society of a large
winning coalition (moderated mediation effect). The following section expounds on these several
segments of theoretical rationale, respectively.
3.3.1. Moderation Effect: Foreign Aid, Winning Coalition, and Economic Growth 26
Supposedly, foreign aid should help the recipient economy because these assistances aim to
improve the country’s basic economic and social environment by increasing government
revenue. However, not all aid helps the recipient economy, and the effectiveness of aid varies
among the recipients. The reason is that aid money is fungible, and not all of the money goes into
where it is supposed to go for.27
Indeed, many countries and governments spend the money in various fungible ways
(McGillivray and Morrissey 2004). The government literally pockets the money and keeps it for
themselves or distributes some of them directly to its supporters.28 The government officials and
policy practitioners also steal the aid and channel the money to subsidize and fund their other
industries or businesses where the aid is not supposed to go for.29

26

This part of the paper is a brief version of the main argument of the first essay.
Aid is fungible, by definition, if the recipient country uses the aid resources for purposes other than those intended
by the donor (McGuire 1978).
28
Mobuto Sese Seko, the former President of Zaire from 1965 to 1997, was just one of the most harmful leaders who
reportedly looted the foreign aid money for his own private interests and enjoy his luxurious life for decades, while
droving the people into poverty (World Bank 1998, 1; New York Times, June 22, 1997).
29
For example, Rana and Koch (2020, 7-8) found that a large portion of developmental aid in Pakistan was “reappropriated” by the government towards other projects where their political priorities, which leads to an inefficient
aid allocation.
27
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This fungibility of aid money allows the political leaders to use it for their own gain as
long as they can stay in power. However, each political leader faces a different degree of
political constraints, which leads them to adopt different political and economic policies and
strategies. It ultimately impacts how and where to spend the aid. In a society requiring wideranging support from their people for their political survival, the leader would spend the aid as
public goods to secure the support. On the other hand, in a society relying only on a small group
of people, the leader would spend the aid as private goods for the supporters.
According to selectorate theory, where the leader only needs the small group of
supporters to stay in power, a small winning coalition, it is easier and safer for them to give
direct and private benefits to their supporters. In contrast, where the leaders need support from a
large group of citizens, a large winning coalition, it is more efficient to provide public goods
because everyone in the society can benefit from public goods without sacrificing others (Bueno
de Mesquita et al. 2003).
Thus, aid is not necessarily spent to provide public goods unless the government has to
do it for their political survival. The reason is that the primary concern for all government leaders
is to keep their office, not to sincerely improve the well-being of the entire citizens (Bueno de
Mesquita and Root 2002). In fact, as an unearned and freer income, aid increases the possibility
of office holding and regime stability by spending the money to provide rents and patronage to
the members of their winning coalition (Ahmed 2012; Nieto-Matiz and Schenoni 2018).
In large winning coalition societies, foreign aid is also turned toward providing more
public goods and services to support the citizens and keep the office (Cao and Tamer 2015, 11).
On the other hand, in small coalition societies, a large proportion of the aid is used by and for the
leaders’ private goods. In this case, those resources do not flow to public spending and are
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predominately used as private rewards for their coalition members (Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith 2009; Licht 2010).
When it comes to spending aid, these differences between private and public goods
significantly impact its economic growth. It is because providing efficient and sufficient public
goods, which is one of the crucial roles of governments as well as the primary aim of foreign aid,
has shown to be beneficial to the economy (Clark, Poast, Flores, and Kaufman 2011; Taydas and
Peksen 2012; Rahnama, Fawaz, and Gittings 2017). For instance, fundamental public goods,
such as access to safe drinking water, sanitation, transport, medical care, and school, are critical
to individual well-being (Besley and Ghatak 2004). Accordingly, it improves the quality of the
labor force and enhances human capital, which eventually leads to the productive economic
capacity of the county. Moreover, these public goods stimulate private investment and capital
inflow into the countries by making them more market-friendly (Lucas 1988).
To sum up, foreign aid, as not only an additional but also less accountable government
revenue, is likely to reinforce the existing patterns of government spending. Governments in the
case of large winning coalitions are more likely to spend the aid as public goods, while
governments in the case of small winning coalitions are more likely to spend it as private goods.
The economic consequence of it is that the foreign aid is more effective for economic growth in
the society of large winning coalitions because the money is spent more like public goods,
whereas it is less effective in the society of small winning coalitions because it is spent more like
private goods.
3.3.2. Mediation Effect: Economic Growth and Political Violence
There is no doubt that economic condition such as economic growth changes its political
conditions. Specifically, the growing economy helps strengthen the power of political leaders
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and weaken the power of potential opponents. Intuitively, economic growth helps governments,
since people tend to perceive the growing national economy as a sign of the incumbent’s
competence, and they support the current governments (Londregan and Poole 1996; Alesina,
Roubini, and Cohen1997; Palmer and Whitten 1999; Wolfers 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003; Leigh 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Malone 2011; Burke 2012).
With the increased revenue owing to the growing economy, the government can also
materially invest more money and resources to build and improve its military and security
capability, which is conducive to controlling the potential rebels and opposition groups (Brender
and Drazen 2008). In the perspective of potential rebels, the economic growth makes it harder
for them to initiate the conflict because it reduces their ability to foster support for their cause.
On the other hand, economic slowdown increases the attractiveness of political violence because
it makes it easier for opponents to organize the resistance by causing economic and social
problems such as the unemployed and grievances against governments.
Relatedly, a citizen, as a rational individual who enjoys materially improving life from
the growing national economy, satisfies the status quo and tends to be less likely to commit and
involve in violence. It is because they know that provoking or engaging in violent activities leads
to compromising the current stable life, and the potential gain resulting from the violence is not
guaranteed to exceed what they already enjoy.30 Indeed, a growing economy, often coming along
with more work opportunities and income distribution, certainly gives less incentive for
individuals to disrupt the society and support violence (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Hansen and
Tarp 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Dimico 2013).

30

This rationale is well known as 'loss aversion' in the gain dimension, which is theorized and proved in many
studies on prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Levy 1996; Boettcher 2004).
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In contrast, material scarcity and deprivation often make an individual desperate and
aggressive, which increases the attractiveness to commit any form of violence (Messner and
Rosenfeld 1999; Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Ballentine and Sherman
2003; Collier 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). At a country level, it means that poverty
and economic recessions certainly make the citizens unsatisfied and belligerent at the status quo
of their life and governments, which makes easy for the potential rebels and opposition groups to
recruit joiners and gain support from people (Gurr 1968; Sem 2008; Taydas and Peksen 2012).
It is not a rare story that many deprived young men indeed perpetrated violence,
especially physical violence. If these young men had other sources of income and hope in their
life, they might not commit violence against others. Deprivation and inequality have been
arguably the most critical motivation in many political conflicts. A female ex-combatant of the
Liberian civil war in 2004 stated: “I joined the rebel forces to fight inequality in the country, and
because of this issue, I also encouraged my three children to join (cited in Richards 2005, 579).”
Thus, the growing national economy, as a whole, contributes to reducing violence and
conflict in society as it changes the balance of power and the attractiveness of violence among
governments, potential rebels, and people. In this sense, it is also not a coincidence that SubSaharan Africa has recorded a positive economic growth rate since the 1970s and experienced a
gradual reduction in the overall number of civil conflicts during the same period. Specifically,
the sub-Saharan region’s economic growth rate had rarely fallen into the negative one, and the
average annual rate is 3.33% during 1970-2010 (World Bank).31 The number of ongoing civil
wars in Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen from 15 in 1990 to 7 in 2010 (Fearon 2017, 21), including

31

This region even experienced a steady increase in income per capita at the same period as well. GDP per capita in
that region has been increased from 222 US$ in 1970 to 967 US$ in 1981 and 1,885 US$ in 2014 (World Bank).
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the end of several prolonged civil wars in Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In fact, economic
prosperity was the most effective way to reduce political violence in Africa and elsewhere
(Bellows and Miguel 2006).
Many empirical studies have confirmed the tendency that violent civil conflicts are more
likely to occur in underdeveloped countries (de Soysa 2002; Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler,
Reynal-Querol, and Sambanis 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenty
2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). For instance, the work of Collier et
al. (2003) emphasizes that economically vulnerable countries such as those suffering low
income, low growth, and dependence upon natural resources, in effect, are playing Russian
roulette on the outbreak of civil war. According to the authors, these countries, by skill or luck,
may manage to constrain the violence for some years, but eventually to see it explode, as seen in
Cote d’Ivoire (in 2002) and Nepal (in 1996).32 To be specific, they found statistical evidence that
the probability of a country experiencing civil war drops by one percent with every extra one
percent increase in the country’s income. In the following simulation, the study also showed that
0.7 percent of low-income countries go from peace to war each year, whereas only 0.3 percent of
middle-income countries do so (Collier et al. 2003).
In addition to absolute poverty, the relative decline of income and growth is vulnerable to
civil war. Miguel et al. (2003) found that a one percent decline in the gross domestic product
increases the likelihood of civil conflict by more than 2 percent. This result implies that a drop in

32

These two countries are the instances that moderately democratic low-income countries with long histories of
peace eventually collapsed into civil war, blaming for the deep-rooted poverty and economic hardship (Collier et al.
2003, 108).
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income per capita by 4 percent in one year increases the likelihood of a civil conflict in the
following year by nearly half.
Terrorist activity, especially domestic terrorist attacks, is also more prevalent in the poor
economy, often intertwined with poverty, inequality, and unemployment (Fearon and Laitin
2003; Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana 2004; Azam and Delacroix 2006; Sayre 2009; Freytag,
Krüger, Meierrieks, and Schneider 2009; Piazza 2011; Caruso and Schneider 2013; Ezcurra and
Palacios 2016). Palestine experienced more terrorist attacks when the employment rates were
high during 1993–2001 (Sayre 2009). The worsening labor market condition reduces the
opportunity costs for the violent behavior of the potential opponents. Similarly, inequality and
poverty are closely related to domestic terrorism (Ezcurra and Palacios 2016). It is because
inequality and poverty make people feel apathy, discontent, and discrimination, and those
negative sentiments facilitate violence and radical behavior. Piazza (2011) ’s study highlighted
that the economic grievances, which are pronounced particularly in marginalized ethnic groups,
are more prone to the involvement in terrorist groups. Even high-income and democratic
countries could experience terrorist attacks when they face economic downward (Blomberg,
Hess, and Weerapana 2004).
In sum, the growing economy and prosperous societies are more immunes to political
violence such as civil war and domestic terrorism. On the other hand, economic hardship and
sluggishness are more vulnerable to those political conflicts.
3.3.3. Moderated Mediation Effect: Foreign Aid, Winning Coalition, Economic Growth, and
Political Violence
Taking the previous discussions together, (1) the link between foreign aid, winning coalition, and
economic growth and (2) the link between economic growth and political violence, I ultimately
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argue that foreign aid reduces political violence via its role in the economic growth of the
recipient countries, which occurs under the circumstance where the political leaders face a broad
set of domestic constraint. In specific, political leaders in the case of a large winning coalition
tend to spend foreign aid more to provide public goods rather than private goods. Accordingly,
the recipient country is more likely to achieve economic growth, which reduces the incidence of
political violence in the recipient countries. In contrast, political leaders in the case of a small
winning coalition tend to spend more money to provide private goods. In this situation, aid is
unlikely to help the economy, which, in turn, will not affect its political violence.
In short, aid reduces the probability of political violence when it helps the economic
growth of the recipient country, which is more likely to occur in the society of a large winning
coalition (moderated mediation effect).

3.4. Empirical Analysis
3.4.1. Model Specification
To evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid on political violence described in the previous
section, I specified a regression-based structural equation model, which requires two sets of
equations: (1) Economic Growth and (2) Political Violence.
Equation (1) was set for investigating the effect of foreign aid and winning coalition on
economic growth. The main independent variables are foreign aid (ODA), the size of winning
coalition (WC), and its interaction term (ODA*WC), and the dependent variable is economic
growth (Growth) in this equation. Particularly, the interaction term was included to investigate
the conditional (or mediating) effect of the size of winning coalition on the relationship between
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foreign aid on economic growth as the theoretical argument of this essay suggests. I expect that
the interaction coefficient is positive as the winning coalition size increases aid effectiveness on
growth.
I also included several control variables, which are significant determinants of growth
and utilized in many aid-growth studies (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Hansen and Tarp 2001;
Collier 2007; Wagner 2014; Mohapatra, Giri, and Seharawat 2016; Adeola 2017; Younsi,
Khemili, and Bechtini 2019; Maruta, Banerjee, and Cavoli 2020).33 In particular, GDP per capita
(GDP) is included to capture the size of the economy. Gross fixed capital formation (CF) is
included to account for investment in physical capital. Population growth (PG) is included as an
indicator of the growth of the labor force. Trade openness (TO) is included to capture the
importance of international factors such as advanced technologies among the trading countries,
thereby increasing growth. Government expenditure (GE) is included to capture the extent of
public goods provided by the government. Education attainment (EA) is included as a proxy for
human capital. Inflation (IF) is included as a proxy for the stability of the macroeconomic and
business environment. Lastly, government crisis (GCR) is included to capture the political
instability.
Next, equation (2) was set for investigating the effect of economic growth on political
violence. For political violence, I used two dependent variables, the number of onset of civil war
(Y1) and domestic terrorist attack (Y2), which need their own equations. In specific, in the civil
war equation (2-1), the dependent variable is the number of civil war onset (CW), and the
independent variables are foreign aid (ODA) and growth (Growth). To control the potential

33

These control variables are chosen based on a neoclassical growth model. The basic argument of this model is that
the economic growth of a country can be explained by looking at capital accumulation, labor or population growth,
and productivity improvement.
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sources for the rebels, I also included additional variables (Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Ree and
Nillesen 2006). Excluded population (EP) was included for grievances of the rebels, that is,
political exclusion. Population (PO) was included for the country’s size effects. GDP per capita
(GDP) was included for costs for recruitment. The duration of peace (DR) was included because
if a civil war has recently ended, the new rebels may easily obtain military and experienced
soldiers and weapons and have a strong desire for revenge. Ethnic fractionalization (EF) and
religious fractionalization (RF) were included for social cohesion within rebel groups and interethnic hatred. Lastly, I included mountainous terrain (MT) for controlling the country’s
geography for the military conditions of rebels.
In terrorist attack equation (2-2), the dependent variable is the number of domestic
terrorist attacks (DT, Y2), and the independent variables are foreign aid (ODA) and growth
(Growth). Then, I also included several variables to control for the potential sources of the
terrorist attack (Gassebner and Luechinger 2011; Choi and Piazza 2016; Danzell, Kisangani, and
Pickering 2019). Excluded population (EP), population (PO), GDP per capita (GDP), and
durability (DR) were included for the same reasons as the civil war equation. Political rights
(PR) and civil liberty (CL) variables were included to control for political and civil participation,
which are expected to reduce domestic terrorism. Thus, the model is constructed as follows:
Growth= iGrowth + a1ODA + a2WC + a3(ODA*WC) + a4CVs + ε (1)
Political Violence (CW (Y1) and DT (Y2)) = iPolitical Violence + c’ODA +
bGrowth + d1CVs + ε (2)
Where i represents constant terms of each equation. CVs contains a set of control variables of
each equation described above and ε represents the error term.
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The description of the variables used in this study is below and ln denotes variables in
natural logs:
Growth = economic growth rate as measured by GDP growth rate (%)
ODA = the official development assistance (ODA, disbursement) share of GDP (%)34 (ln)
WC = the size of the winning coalition as measured by 5 scales, ranging from 0 to 1, by
0.25 35
GDP = total amount of GDP per capita (ln)
GC = total amount of government consumption expenditure (ln)
CF = the domestic gross capital formation share of GDP (%) (ln)
PG = population growth rate (%)
IF = inflation rate (%) (ln)
TO = trade openness as measured by the total amount of import and export share of GDP
(%) (ln)
EA = education attainment as measured by the average years of total schooling
GCR = the number of major government crises defined as any rapidly developing
situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding
situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow

34

Concerning how to measure aid, there are some options: the raw value of aid, aid/population, and aid/GDP.
However, this study used aid/GDP for the following reasons. First, raw values are not informative due to differences
in income and population between countries. One option is to scale total and received by a given country (one time)
by its population size, suggesting per capita and as the "treatment" variable of interest. This is an intuitive measure
and is technically appealing as many intermediate outcomes are expressed in population terms (e.g., average years of
schooling, life expectancy). Nevertheless, aid/population has specific limitations compared to the use of the aid to
GDP (aid/GDP), which has been more commonly used in the literature to date. First, it is hard to give a sensible or
clear interpretation to any estimated effect of aid per capita on key macroeconomic outcomes, where variables are
often measured in terms of or scaled by GDP. For instance, suppose we find that an inflow of US $10 of aid per
capita causes the GDP growth rate to rise by 1 percentage point. Although this may be of interest per se, the problem
is that the implied benefit-cost ratio is ambiguous because it depends on the initial size of the economy. Second, it is
reasonable to assume that the real cost of providing a given flow of public services, such as education, tends to
increase with GDP. Thus, especially over long time frames, the relative purchasing power of aid over a wide range
of outcomes is best considered in economic terms, not population terms (Arndt, Jones, and Tarp 2015, 9).
35
The size of the winning coalition, WC, is measured as described in The Logic of Political Survival (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003). WC ranges from 0 (smallest winning coalition) to 1 (largest winning coalition), and it consists
of four components, each being worth 0.25 of the aggregate score. 0.25 is added to WC for each of the following
conditions: (i) the regime is neither a ‘‘military’’ nor a ‘‘civilian military’’ regime as coded by Banks (2007); (ii)
candidates for executive office are chosen via dual executive election or open election (Polity IV ‘‘xropen’’ > 2);
(iii) executives are chosen via competitive elections (Polity IV ‘‘xrcomp’’ > = 2); and (iv) elections are typified by
free and noncoerced competition of regularly active political groups (Polity IV ‘‘parcomp’’ = 5). More information
about these components is available in Banks (2007) and Marshall and Jaggers (2002).
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CW = the number of onset of civil war
DT = the number of domestic terrorist attack events (ln)
EP = excluded population as measured by the proportion of the population that includes
members of ethnic groups that are excluded from power (an ethnic group is defined
as being excluded if it has a status below “junior partner” in the Ethnic Power
Relations) (%)
PO = total population (ln)
DR = durability as measured by the number of years since the most recent regime change
EF = ethnic fractionalization as measured by the proportion of the population of each
ethnic group to the total population of the country, squaring it, and summing the
squared proportions for all groups, and subtract that number from 1 to come up with
the fractionalization measure
RF = religious fractionalization as measured by the proportion of the population of each
religion group to the total population of the country, squaring it, and summing the
squared proportions for all groups, and subtract that number from 1 to come up with
the fractionalization measure
MT = the share of the country’s area covered by mountains (%) (ln)
PR = political rights as measured by several dimensions of the society; electoral process,
political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government, ranging from 1
(free) to 7 (not free)
CL = civil liberty as measured by several dimensions of the society; freedom of
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and
personal autonomy and individual rights, range from 1 (free) to 7 (not free)

3.4.2. Data
For the growth equation (1), most of the economic variables – growth (GDP growth, annual %),
GDP (per capita), government consumption (government consumption expenditure), capital
formation (gross capital formation, % of GDP), population growth (annual %), inflation
(annual %), trade openness (calculated using exports and imports data, % of GDP) were taken
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Data on foreign aid (ODA) were
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obtained from OECD statistics (measuring total receipts by country and year (% of GDP),
disbursement Data on the size of winning coalition were obtained from Banks (2008) and
Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) (regime type) and Polity IV dataset (elections). Lastly,
data on education attainment (average years of total schooling) were taken from Barro and Lee
(2018), and data on government crisis were from replication data from Bordea, Elbadawi, and
Houle (2017), respectively.
For the political violence equation (2), the dependent variables, data on civil wars36 and
domestic terrorist attacks37 were taken from Monty G. Marshall (2017).38 Data on excluded
population and durability were obtained from replication data from Bodea, Elbadawi, and Houle
(2017). Data on population and GDP (per capita) were from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI). Data on ethnic and religious fractionalization were obtained
from Alesina et al. (2003). Data on durability (the number of years since the most recent regime
change) were obtained from the Polity IV project dataset. The mountainous terrain was from the
EPR dataset. Political rights and civil liberty data were from the Freedom House dataset. The
descriptive statistics of the variables studied in this analysis were presented in Table 1.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES
Growth (%)
ODA (% GDP)
Winning Coalition
GDP (per capita)
Government Consumption

Mean
SD
4.109
7.221
7.713
64.49
0.456
0.257
5,757
10,589
1.373e+10 3.924e+10

36

Min
-64.05
-592.9
0
115.8
730,983

Max
150.0
2,796
1
114,161
7.820e+11

This paper considers civil war as any intrastate 'contested incompatibility' between the government and a third
party with the use of armed forces that caused at least 1000 battle-related deaths as many civil war literature such as
Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002) and Taydas and Peksen (2012).
37
Domestic terrorist attack (also called homegrown terrorism) is defined as a form of terrorism in which victims
“within a country are targeted by a perpetrator with the same citizenship” as the victims (Gary M. Jackson 2012,
235).
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Capital Formation
Population Growth (%)
Inflation (%)
Trade Openness
Education Attainment
Government Crisis
Log ODA (% GDP)
Log GDP (per capita)
Log Government Consumption
Log Capital Formation
Log Inflation (%)
Log Trade Openness
Civil War
Domestic Terrorist Attack
Excluded Population (%)
Log Population
Durability
Ethnic Fractionalization
Religious Fractionalization
Log Mountain (%)
Political Rights
Civil Liberty
Log Domestic Terrorist Attack

22.84
2.113
39.44
78.23
4.809
0.15
0.856
7.768
21.66
3.033
1.901
4.165
0.312
9.304
0.191
14.8
15.665
0.47
0.44
2.23
4.57
4.48
-2.53

11.44
1.592
530.8
51.76
2.768
0.49
1.613
1.299
1.904
0.468
1.339
0.684
1.164
47.60
0.247
2.31
17.410
0.25
0.23
1.40
1.93
1.59
3.13

-5.740
-10.96
-35.84
0
0.0400
0
-8.705
4.752
13.50
-1.228
-4.191
-3.863
0
0
0
8.4
0
0
0
0
1
1
-4.61

219.1
17.70
24,411
531.7
12.32
7
7.936
11.65
27.39
5.389
10.10
6.276
7
1,252
0.98
21.05
105
0.93
0.86
4.42
7
7
7.13

3.4.3. Methods
For the estimation methods, I adopted and utilized a moderated mediation model to test the
relationship between foreign aid (ODA, X), the size of winning coalition (WC, W), economic
growth (Growth, M), and political violence (CW and DT, Y). The moderated mediation, also
known as a conditional indirect effect, occurs when the treatment effect of an independent
variable (X) on an outcome variable (Y) via a mediator variable (M) differs depending on the
levels of a moderator variable (W). Specifically, either the effect of X on M, and/or the effect of
M on Y depends on the level of W (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007). Thus, the simplest
conceptualization of the moderated mediation has two forms. One is a first-stage moderated
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mediation, which refers to when the moderating variable (W) influences the X  M relationship.
The other one is a second-stage moderated mediation, which refers to when the moderating
variable (W) influences the M  Y relationships (Edwards and Lambert 2007). Here, the first
and second stages are involved in the particular path, and they are indicated as path ‘a’ and ‘b,’
respectively. On behalf of the relevance of the empirical strategy for the theoretical arguments, I
utilized a first-stage moderated mediation with the following two equations:
M = iM + a1X + a2W + a3XW (3)
Y = iY + cʹX + bM (4)
By including the moderator (W) and the product term (XW) in Equation (3), the effect of
the independent variable on the mediator can vary as a function of the moderator. Similar to a
general mediation model, the indirect effect of X on Y is calculated as the product of the effects
of X on M and M on Y. However, in moderated mediation, the product term must also be
allowed for the indirect effect to be conditional on W. By substituting Equation (3) into Equation
(4), the first stage moderated mediation model can be estimated as
Y = iY + cʹX + biM + a1bX + a2bW + a3bXW (5)
Here, X’s effect on M is expressed as (a1 + a3W), and M’s effect on Y is b. The
conditional indirect effect (ω) of X on Y is then expressed as ω = (a1 + a3W)b, which can be
rearranged as ω = a1b + a3bW. Thus, coefficient a3b is the estimated effect of W on the indirect
effect of X on Y through M.
Hypothesis testing to determine whether the a3b coefficient, known as the index of
moderated mediation (IMM), is statistically different from zero can be carried out through
bootstrap confidence interval evaluations (Hayes 2015). A confidence interval that does not
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contain zero is evidence that the indirect effect is moderated. The index approach to test
moderated mediation is helpful because it relies on only one inferential test and directly assesses
the statistical significance of the relationship between the moderator and the indirect effect
(Edwards and Konold 2020, 5).
A statistically significant index of moderated mediation provides evidence that the
indirect effect is conditional on the values of the moderator; however, this does not imply that
the indirect effect is statistically different from zero at all points of W (Edwards and Konold
2020, 5-6). In order to ascertain at which points of W the indirect effect is significant, formal
testing of the indirect effect at various values of W is required. When the moderator is
categorical, the indirect effect is simply tested at the coded values of W. For continuous
variables, the choice of W values at which to test the indirect effect is less straightforward.
Researchers often rely on commonly used conventions to select points that represent low,
medium, and high values on the moderator (Edwards and Konold 2020, 6). One convention is to
plot the mean and one standard deviation both above and below the mean. Another common
choice is to select values representing various percentiles of the variable’s distribution, such as
the 16th and 86th percentiles (Hayes 2018, 250). In other situations, the choice of values may be
guided by theory, such that specific values are most relevant to the research question or practical
sense. Once the values of the moderator are selected, the indirect effect is estimated and tested at
each selected value of W with the construction of confidence intervals (Edwards and Konold
2020, 6).
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3.5. Results and Discussion
This study utilized the first-stage moderated mediation model and examined the conditional
indirect effects of foreign aid. How the winning coalition size (W) moderates the mediating
effects of economic growth (M) on the foreign aid (X) and political stability (Y) relations, which
is depicted in Figure 2. The main statistical results were reported in Table 2 and 3. They showed
the path coefficient, standard error, p-value, and R-squared for the moderator (the size of
winning coalition)’s effect of foreign aid (X) on economic growth (M) (‘a’ path) and for the
mediator’s effect on civil conflict (Y1) and domestic terrorist attack (Y2) (‘b’ path) controlling
for the several variables described in the previous section of this paper.
In specific, for the equation (1), the effect of foreign aid (X) itself on economic growth
(M) is not statistically significant in both civil war (Y1) (a1 = 0.003, p = 0.96) and terrorist attack
(Y2) (a1 = 0.006, p = 0.94). However, the interaction terms between foreign aid and the size of
winning coalition (XW) together on growth (M) are positive and statistically significant in both
equations (a3 = 1.737, p < 0.01 for civil war (Y1), a3 = 1.748, p < 0.01 for domestic terrorist
attack (Y2)). The results imply that receiving more foreign aid may not necessarily contribute to
better economic growth in every circumstance. However, it does help the economy under certain
circumstances, referring to the case of a large winning coalition.
Also, for the equation (2), economic growth (M) is negatively related to its number of
civil war (Y1) and domestic terrorist attacks (Y2) and both are statistically significant (b = 0.014, p < 0.01 for civil war (Y1), b = -0.054, p < 0.01 for domestic terrorist attack (Y2)). That
is, aid recipient countries experiencing positive economic growth also experience fewer numbers
of violent political incidents.
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Figure 3.2: A Statistical Diagram for Foreign Aid – Winning Coalition – Economic Growth –
Political Violence

Table 3.2: Summary Information for Foreign Aid – Economic Growth – Civil War
Outcome
Predictor
X
W
XW
M

Economic Growth (M)
Civil War (Y1)
Path
Coeff.
SE
p
Path
Coeff.
SE
p
a1
0.003
0.062
0.96
c’
0.02
0.018
0.26
a2
-7.387
0.372
0.000
a3
1.737
0.049
0.000
b
-0.014
0.005
0.005
R-squared = 0.74
R-squared = 0.14
F-statistics = 5449.064 , p-value = 0.000
Index of Moderated Mediation (IMM) = -0.025 (SD = 0.009), p-value = 0.007

Table 3.3: Summary Information for Foreign Aid – Economic Growth – Domestic Terrorist
Attack
Outcome
Predictor
X
W
XW

Economic Growth (M)
Path
Coeff.
SE
a1
0.006
0.082
a2
-7.269
0.526
a3
1.748
0.052

p
0.94
0.00
0.00
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Path
c’

Terrorist Attack (Y2)
Coeff.
SE
-0.20
0.076
-

p
0.009
-

M

b
-0.054
0.015
0.000
R-squared = 0.74
R-squared = 0.18
F-statistics = 5976.524, p-value = 0.000
Index of Moderated Mediation (IMM) = -0.094 (SD = 0.026), p-value = 0.000
These results combined together support the theoretical expectations. First, foreign aid

has positive impacts on economic growth, which is conditional on the winning coalition’s size,
although there is no direct effect of foreign aid on economic growth. Second, economic growth
reduces political violence (that is, the number of civil wars and domestic terrorist attacks) in the
aid recipient countries. Based on these empirics, I further conducted a formal test of moderated
mediation: it allows exploring and showing how the relationships among these variables, foreign
aid, economic growth, and political violence (civil war and terrorist attack), are changed when
the winning coalition size is changed (Hayes 2015). The results (Index of Moderated Mediation
for civil war = 0.025, p < 0.01 and for domestic terrorist attack = -0.094, p < 0.01, respectively)
confirmed that the winning coalition’s size moderated the indirect effect of foreign aid on the
political violence.39 That is, the change in the size of winning coalition makes the difference in
the impact of foreign aid on economic growth and political violence.
Nonetheless, merely examining the signs and magnitudes of the regression coefficients
and IMM is generally not sufficient for testing moderated mediation hypotheses, as mentioned
earlier. To gain further insight into this moderated mediation effect thus, I examined the nature
of the conditional indirect effects graphically (Figure 3). These plots are called the mediated
simple slopes plots. What these plots show is how foreign aid (X) indirectly affects political

39

It is not the main theoretical concern of this paper, but worthwhile to mention that there is a difference in terms of
the direct effect of foreign aid on civil war and domestic terrorist attack (c'). As the result showed, foreign aid has no
direct effect on civil war (β = 0.02, p = 0.26), while it is statistically significant and has a negative effect on
domestic terrorist attack (β = -0.20. p = 0.009) (that is, the increase of foreign aid is associated with the decline of
the incidence of the domestic terrorist attack).
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violence (Y) (the left for civil wars (Y1) and the right for terrorist attacks (Y2)) through
economic growth (M) at two characteristic values of winning coalition sizes (W), which is called
the pick-a-point approach. A separate line represents each value of the moderator. For the
numerical variable, the 16th (lower value) and 84th (higher value) percentiles of the distribution of
the variable are taken, as recommended by Hayes (2018, 250), to draw the figures. The parallel
lines indicate the absence of moderation, and crossing lines suggest the presence of moderation
(Verboon and Peters 2019).
Figure 3 shows the two lines between the higher and lower values of the winning
coalition (left panel for civil war (Y1) and right panel for domestic terrorism (Y2)) are crossed
each other. It means that as the size of winning coalition increases, the indirect effect of aid on
political violence increases, and the difference in the effect of moderated mediation is
significant. In specific, when the size of winning coalition (W) is 84th percentile (high value, blue
line), foreign aid (X) predicts a moderated decline in the number of civil war (Y1) and domestic
terrorist attacks (Y2). However, when the size of winning coalition (W) is 16th percentile (low
value, red line), foreign aid (X) is not related to the decline in the number of civil wars (Y1) and
domestic terrorist attacks (Y2).
The results suggest that the winning coalition size mediates the effect of foreign aid on
economic growth, which in turn affects the political violence (civil war and domestic terrorist
attack) of the recipient countries at different levels and directions. That is, foreign aid (X) leads
to a decrease in political violence (Y) due to the positive relationship between the winning
coalition (W) and economic growth (M) when the winning coalition is at higher values. On the
other hand, foreign aid (X) does not decrease its political violence (Y) due to no relationship
between the winning coalition (W) and economic growth (M) when the winning coalition is at a
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lower value. In other words, in the case of large winning coalitions, foreign aid has a strong and
negative effect on political violence through the mediating effect of economic growth. In the
case of small winning coalitions, however, the aid does not reduce the political violence because
there is no significant effect of aid on economic growth.
Figure 3.3: Simple Slope Plots for Relationship between Foreign Aid, Economic Growth, and
Political Conflict across the Size of Winning Coalition (left: civil war (Y1) and right: terrorist
attack (Y2))
Simple slopes in x-m path for indirect effect
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When it comes to the rest of the control variables, some conditions contribute to its
economic growth and political violence (Table 4). For example, capital formation and inflation
show statistically significant impacts on its economic growth for both equations (1) (that is, for
civil war (Y1) and domestic terrorist attack (Y2)). In addition, for equation (2), population and
the duration of peace are statistically significant to civil war (Y1) and domestic terrorist attack
(Y2), which were the common variables in both equations.
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Table 3.4: Full Models of Moderated Mediation Analysis
Growth Equation
ODA (% GDP) (log)
Winning Coalition
ODA (log) * W.C.
GDP per capita (log)
Gov’t. Consumption (log)
Capital Formation (log)
Population Growth (%)
Inflation (log) (%)
Trade Openness (log)
Education Attainment
Government Crisis
R-squared
Political Violence Equation
Economic Growth (%)
ODA (% GDP) (log)
Excluded Population (%)
Population (log)
GDP per capita (log)
Durability
Ethnic Fractionalization

Civil War

Terrorist Attack

0.003
(0.062)
-7.387***
(0.372)
1.737***
(0.049)
-0.047
(0.110)
-0.035
(0.051)
0.716***
(0.232)
0.102
(0.092)
-0.110*
(0.058)
-0.023
(0.142)
-0.024
(0.041)
-0.237*
(0.131)
0.74

0.006
(0.082)
-7.269***
(0.526)
1.748***
(0.052)
0.019
(0.118)
-0.072
(0.057)
0.780***
(0.263)
0.101
(0.090)
-0.115*
(0.070)
-0.031
(0.169)
-0.008
(0.040)
-0.276
(0.174)
0.14

-0.014***
(0.005)
0.02
(0.018)
-0.063
(0.130)
0.120***
(0.016)
-0.125***
(0.020)
-0.006***
(0.001)
0.158

-0.054***
(0.076)
-0.20***
(0.076)
1.070***
(0.385)
0.850***
(0.055)
0.005
(0.088)
-0.009**
(0.005)
-
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Religious Fractionalization
Mountain (%) (log)
Political Rights

(0.098)
-0.326***
(0.095)
0.008
(0.012)
-

Civil Liberty
R-squared
Observations

0.74
1,982
Standard errors in parentheses

-0.462***
(0.085)
-0.462***
(0.114)
0.18
1,732

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

To sum up, these empirical findings, in general, support the theoretical arguments by
showing that economic growth mediates the relationship between foreign aid and political
violence (civil war and domestic terrorist attack), and the size of winning coalition moderates
this indirect effect. As the size of winning coalition becomes larger, the economic impact of
foreign aid becomes more positive. Those interactions, in turn, contribute to reducing the risk of
the recipient countries experiencing political violence.

3.6. Conclusion
The purpose of this essay was to examine the relationship between foreign aid, economic growth,
and political violence. Theoretically, I argued that foreign aid contributes to reducing the
recipient countries’ political violence through its role on economic growth, which is conditional
on the size of winning coalition. The larger the winning coalition sizes, the more the political
leaders spend foreign aid to provide public goods, which helps the recipient economy. In
addition, the positive economic growth facilitated by the interaction effect between foreign aid
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and a larger winning coalition, in turn, contributes to decreasing the risk of political violence. It
is because economic well-being increases the value of the individual’s perception toward
maintaining the status quo. That is, the improvement of their material prosperity increases the
current government’s popularity and discourages the potential rebels from challenging them.
This theoretical argument was empirically tested by utilizing the IMM estimation
strategy. The result showed that the effectiveness of foreign aid on economic growth is
conditional on the winning coalition’s size. More precisely, aid-recipient countries in the case of
larger winning coalitions tend to achieve higher economic growth than those countries in the
case of smaller ones. Second, economic growth has a positive effect in reducing the recipient
country’s political violence. The countries experiencing higher economic growth are also less
likely to experience civil wars and domestic terrorist attacks. Taken together, it confirmed the
theoretical argument that foreign aid has a conditional indirect effect on its political violence via
its role on economic growth. In the case of large coalition size, aid-recipient counties achieve
better economic performance, which in turn experience fewer civil wars and terrorist attacks.
This study contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of foreign aid in a couple
of ways. First, as far as my knowledge, it is the first study that empirically showed that foreign
aid helps the recipient countries’ political peace via its role in economic growth. It is an
important distinction from the existing literature, which theorized that aid inflow directly affects
conflict or peace. That is, foreign aid is invested in increasing the government’s capacity to deter
potential violence. Alternatively, it increases the incentives and payoffs for the rebels. By doing
so, those studies relatively neglected the key purpose of aid, economic growth. This study filled
the gap by theorizing and empirically testing the mediating effect of economic growth between
foreign aid and political conflict.
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Pointing out the role of foreign aid in reducing the political violence in the recipient
countries, this essay also informs us that the international community can help the developing
countries, enhancing global peace. That is, foreign aid, as one of the key foreign and
international policies, is even effective in promoting international cooperation and peace, which
is beyond the explicit targets of aid, the recipient country’s economic well-being.
The empirical findings provide some policy implications. First, the finding that foreign
aid and the institutional characteristics of recipient countries mediate the effects of political
stability suggests that only providing more foreign aid is insufficient to achieve the political
stability and peace of the recipient countries. Donor countries and international organizations
need to ensure the recipient countries spend the aid money effectively and efficiently to help
their economic development, which contributes to reducing political violence.
Second, the findings reveal that the interactive effect of foreign aid and the winning
coalition’s size indirectly influences political stability via economic growth as a mediator. These
findings suggest that donors and international organizations should particularly pay more
attention to and monitor the usage of foreign aid in a highly exclusive society. Specifically,
donors and aid policy practitioners should better understand the recipient countries’ political
environment to ensure the practical usage of foreign aid. Otherwise, the aid money can be easily
wasted, even harming the recipient country’s economy and peace.
Finally, some weaknesses of this study also need to be mentioned. First, concerning the
research methods, the estimation technique used in this essay could not take advantage of the
panel dataset structure, mainly due to the underdevelopment of the statistical method. Therefore,
it might suffer some potential issues such as time and sectional fixed effect, which should be
addressed in the future as more advanced statistical methods are developed. Second, concerning
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the theoretical point, this study only examined the effect of economic growth on political
violence. However, other channels might reduce the recipient countries’ political conflict, such
as reducing poverty and inequality via providing foreign aid. Investigating those other links and
their impacts on political violence could be for further work.
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Chapter 4. Foreign Aid and Donor Export: Korea’s ODA

4.1. Introduction
Korea was an aid recipient. For most of the post-Korean War (1950-1953) period, Korea heavily
relied on foreign assistance for the war recovery and its economic development. According to the
government estimates, the country received US$ 12.7 billion between 1945 and the late 1990s.
With the aid given, Korea could overcome from one of the poorest countries to one of the
leading economies in the world. In fact, its GDP reached approximately US$ 1.65 trillion, which
is the 12th largest economy in 2019 (World Bank). Meanwhile, Korea joined OECD in 1996 and
became the 24th member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009.40 Then, as
not only a member of DAC but also a beneficiary of foreign assistance, Korea has been
committed to contributing to ODA: the government spent US$ 2.5 billion on ODA in 2019,
which corresponds to 0.15% of its GNI and is ranked at the 15th largest donor country.
Despite the ideal and goodwill purpose of the aid, the increase in volume and proportion
of ODA causes some political and realistic concern for the Korean government when it comes to
implementing ODA policy. Because citizens are skeptical about the effectiveness of the aid and
reluctant to give their money abroad, it becomes an economic and social burden to the
government. According to a survey, 'The Public Opinion on ODA,' conducted by the Office for
Government Policy Coordination in 2016, 24% of the correspondents evaluated that the current
volume of ODA should be reduced. In contrast, only 13% of the correspondents believed that

40

The DAC currently has 30 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European
Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States (OECD website: http://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assistance-committee/,
accessed on Feb 11, 2021).
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ODA should be increased, down from 25% in 2015. In this regard, examining the effectiveness
of ODA from a donor’s perspective is timely important in promoting public understanding of
foreign aid and ensuring ODA policy. As part of this purpose, this essay aims to investigate
Korea’s ODA and export.
Export, in particular, matters to Korea as their national interests. The successful
economic development of Korea, namely ‘the Miracle on the Han River,’ which refers to the
country’s economic growth at an unprecedented speed, resulted from an export-oriented industry
structure and policy. Korea’s trade dependence has comprised over 70% of its GDP since 2004.
Moreover, the number of exporter enterprises in the domestic market is 94,825 in 2014 (Boh and
Heshmati 2017, 2). These facts imply that Korea’s exports have been and will remain important
as a driving force of its sustainable economic growth and development. In this sense, studying
the export impact of Korea ODA is worthwhile not only for the humanitarian aspect but also for
the aspect of the practical and national interest of the donor.
Theoretically, I argue that foreign aid promotes donor’s export to the recipient. First,
there are direct mechanisms in case the aid is tied. Second, foreign aid allows building political,
economic, and social relationships between donor and recipient countries and increases their
interaction. Therefore, those spillover effects of foreign aid can facilitate donor's export to
recipients. Then, to test the argument, I empirically examined Korean bilateral ODA and export
from 1965 to 2015 by applying a dynamic gravity model with GMM estimators.
By doing so, this essay contributes to the existing literature in two ways. The theoretical
contribution of this study is that I articulated the direct and indirect mechanisms of foreign aid
and donor export, which the existing studies on foreign aid and trade relatively neglect the
discussion of the possible mechanisms and mainly focused on showing empirical evidence. In
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addition, by applying the GMM estimators, I obtained the less biased and more consistent aidexport elasticities. Using the results, I was further able to compute and present the long-term
effect of Korean bilateral aid on its export, which allows a comparison to the effect of other
donors.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the existing
literature on the effects of aid on donor’s export. Section 3 presents the theoretical reasoning of
the relationship between bilateral aid and donor export. Section 4 describes the methodology and
the data used in this paper. Section 5 presents and analyzes the empirical results. Section 6
concludes.

4.2. Literature Review: Foreign Aid and Donor Export
Previous studies investigating the effect of foreign aid on export have focused on the advanced
and western donor countries either as a group of countries or as an individual case. Although the
degree of the effect varies among the literature, those empirical studies, in general, found that
foreign aid has a positive effect on donor’s exports.
4.2.1. Aggregate Effectiveness of Multiple Donors’ Aid on Export
Many early studies analyzed the relationship between foreign aid and donor export at an
aggregate level. For example, Arvin and Baum (1997) examined the relationship between aid
and export by using 17 OECD countries for 1972-1990, and they found that aid is positively
related to its exports. Similarly, Nilsson (1997) investigated the relationship by using data on the
aid and exports of EU countries to developing countries from 1975 to 1992. In specific, applying
for a gravity model, the author showed that US$ 1 of aid increased EU exports by an average of
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US$ 2.6. Wagner (2003) also found that the elasticity of exports to aid for 20 OECD members
during 1970 and 1990 was between 0.062 and 0.195. In other words, it means that, on average,
each US$ 1 given in aid leads to an increase in export of the donor countries between US$ 0.73
and 2.29.
Later, more studies have added robust evidence to the early literature by applying
advanced model specifications and estimation methods (Silva and Nelson 2012; Pettersson and
Johansson 2013; Martinez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, Parra, and Klasen 2014; Temple and Van
de Sijpe 2017). Pettersson and Johansson (2013) used a gravity model for 184 countries between
1990 and 2005 and applied Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein (HMR) model in their study. They found
that aid is positively associated with not only recipients’ export to donors but also donors’ export
to recipients and emphasized that the effect is particularly strong for the Sub-Saharan region.
Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2014) used data on 21 OECD DAC members’ aid and exports to 132
recipient countries from 1988 to 2007. Applying a Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS)
method, the authors found that a one‐percent increase in aid raises donors’ export by 0.039
percent. Using the results, they showed that in the short run, the average return on aid for donors’
export is approximately US$ 0.50 increase in exports for every aid dollar spent, although the
effect varied over time. Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017) also found that aid per GDP increases
net donor’s export. Using data of DAC member’s ODA of three-year averages over 1971 – 2012
to 88 aid recipients and employing a Common Correlated Effects (CCE) method, they showed
that a one‐percent increase in bilateral aid raises donors’ export by 0.0416 percent.
In sum, the existing studies analyzing the effect of aid on donor countries’ export at the
aggregate level showed a general tendency to increase donors’ export towards the recipients.
However, by interpreting the impact of aid on export at the aggregate level, this approach could
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not investigate the possible difference in the magnitude and degree of the effectiveness of aid on
export among individual donors and recipients.
4.2.2. Single-donor’s Aid Effectiveness on Export
As an attempt to address this issue of the aggregate level of analysis, other studies focused on a
single donor and its effectiveness on export (Martinez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, Klasen and
Larch 2009; Martinez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, Klasen and Herzer 2009; Martinez-Zarzoso,
Nowak-Lehmann, Klasen and Johannsen 2016; Hansen and Rand 2014; Martinez-Zarzoso,
Nowak-Lehmann, and Klasen 2017; Zarin-Nejadan, Monteiro, Noormamode 2008; Otor and
Dornan 2017; Otor 2017; Liu and Tang 2018).
For example, both studies, done by Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2009) and Nowak-Lehmann
et al. (2009), investigated the German case and concluded that German bilateral aid increased its
exports to the recipients. In specific, Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2009) found that the average return
for exports on German aid is about US$ 1.4 increase in exports for every dollar spent during the
period from 1962 to 2005. Likewise, Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2009) found that on average, one
dollar of aid increases export between US$ 1.04 and 1.50 during 1962 - 2007. Hansen and Rand
(2014) examined Danish exports to 144 countries from 1981 to 2010 and found that Danish
bilateral aid positively impacts Danish exports to the recipient countries. The average return per
US$ 1 of aid is equivalent to US$ 0.30. In addition, using the data on Australian exports to 17
Asian countries between 1980 and 2013, Otor and Dornan (2017) found that, on average, one
dollar of aid increases its exports by US$ 7.10 in the long run. For the case of Japan, Otor (2017)
found that for US$ 1 spent on ODA, the average return of Japan exports to 15 Asian countries is
between US$ 1.41 – 1.86 during 1972–1991 and US$ 2.03–2.62 during 1992–2008.
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On the one hand, those single-donor studies confirmed that foreign aid promotes trade
between donors and recipients, consistent with the findings of the aggregate level of donor
analysis. At the same time, they also contributed to the literature by uncovering some variations
of the aid effect on its export among donor countries and making it possible to compare each
other. For example, based on the previous empirical findings, some donors (Australia and Japan)
experienced a higher increase in export than other donors (Denmark and Germany).
However, despite these contributions, both the single donor studies and the aggregate
level of donor analyses are still similar in terms of their scope of donor selection. They mainly
focused on the western and developed countries, which are known as “traditional (or the first
generation)” donors (Lloyd, McGillivray, Morrissey, and Osei 2000). By doing so, both
perspectives dealt with the typical pattern of the donor-recipient relationship: the donors are
developed and advanced countries, while the recipients are developing countries. It is true that
foreign aid and development cooperation by those advanced and western-European countries
have a long history and still take a large portion of it. However, it is also true that many
developing countries have recently emerged as “new” (non-western) donors, such as Russia,
China, India, Turkey, and Korea.41 42 Partially because of this short history of being donors, there
are relatively less accumulated empirical studies examining these new donors. This essay fills the

41

According to Dreher, Fuchs, and Nunnenkamp (2013, 402-403), international development cooperation is still
dominated by DAC countries, but the role of other donors is gaining momentum. In particular, only 3.0% of
reported aid originated from non-DAC countries during 1990 – 1994. This share increased to 5.2% in 2005-2009.
This growing contribution of developing countries as aid donors (“new” donors or non-DAC donors) might have a
significant change in development finance and implementation.
42
Some of the works on China are as follows: One is Liu and Tang’s work (2018). The authors found that China’s
aid has a positive effect on its total volume of trade and its export to Africa during the time between 2003 and 2012,
while the aid from the US has little impact on its trade and export to Africa. Similarly, Turcu and Zhang (2018)
studied the impact of China's aid on exports using the data of 159 recipient countries during 2000 - 2014. They
found that the return on Chinese exports of every dollar spent on foreign aid is around 0.2-0.4 US$ at the aggregate
level for the period.
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gap by empirically investigating the Korean case as a new donor country, which will follow the
theoretical reasons why foreign aid increases export to recipients.

4.3. Theoretical Mechanisms of Aid Effect on Donor Export
There are several direct and indirect mechanisms that foreign aid helps donors export to recipient
countries. The first mechanism is the direct effect, which includes ‘tied aid’ (Wagner 2003;
Zarin-Nejadan et al. 2008; Martinez-Zarzoso et al. 2009). The other mechanisms are through the
indirect impact of aid by building up a positive relationship between donors and recipients in
multiple dimensions: political, economic, and social linkages (Wagner 2003; Otor and Dornan
2017).
4.3.1. Direct Links
If aid is tied, it will directly increase the donor's export to the recipients during the period of aid
implementation. It is because the recipients are obligated to use those aid funds to buy goods or
services from the donors. For example, Ghana received US$ 155 million (88% of the total
budget of the project) of foreign aid for the Sixth Power Project during 1990 and 1994 from the
EU, Canada, and Spain, which aimed for maintaining the reliability of Ghana’s electricity
supply. The aid was tied in that the donors made it clear that the project should use products such
as equipment and materials and technology provided by the donors, and all of the bidding
documents were reviewed and approved by the donor countries (Osei 2003, 6-7). In this sense,
aid itself is trade, which involves the direct transfer of goods and services from donors to
recipients. Thus, it is evident that tied aid immediately increases donor export to the recipient
countries, which might not have occurred without the aid.

81

However, the increase in donor’s export to recipients can also occur even without the
explicit tying agreement. For instance, a donor may informally tie aid by choosing to finance
development projects that require supplies from industries where the donor has comparative
advantages (Jempa 1991, 42). Jepma and Bartels (1986, 27-38) showed that the selection of the
sectors to which aid was channeled generally reflected the comparative advantages of the donor
countries. Donors can also “implicitly” tie aid by imposing bidding procedures that the recipient
must follow in the procurement process, which are often similar to the donor’s own domestic
bidding procedures. The donor’s domestic companies, thus, would have an advantage in the
institutional familiarity for bidding to supply the recipient county’s project (Wagner 2003, 158).
Alternatively, export companies of donors may advise the recipients on who to secure aid, that is,
the companies’ home government, for specific development projects to which the companies can
provide supplies. The fact that the U.K. usually recommended that the assistance can be used for
expenditures outside of the U.K. markets only when the price of U.K. suppliers is
“unreasonably” high could be one of the examples of this informal and implicit tied aid practice
(Osei 2004, 6). In sum, tied aid increases donors’ exports to the recipient because of the directly
attached conditionality to the aid.43
4.3.2. Indirect Links
Moreover, aid without tying still generates the same export-promoting effects as tied aid does
(Arvin and Baum 1997; Arvin and Choudhry 1997; Arvin, Cater, and Choudhry 2000). In

The tied aid represents only a small percentage of the donor countries’ total exports. In fact, tied aid turned out to
comprise only about 4 percent of total exports of EC-9 exports during the period 1978–1983 to a representative
group of 32 recipients (Jampa 1991, 41-42). Besides, the proportion of tied aid to untied aid has been even
significantly declining since the 1980s. Based on OECD data, the ratio between total bilateral aid and tied aid has
decreased from over 50% in 1979 to 12% in 2017 worldwide (the absolute amount of tied aid was 9.6 billion
US$ and 13 billion US$ in 2017) (Data extracted on December 11, 2019) from OECD.Stat,
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE7B#).
43
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specific, bilateral aid can be an investment to bring potential economic benefits for donors.
Under the name of the Marshall Plan, the U.S. offered US$ 20 billion to European countries that
fatally suffered from World War II. The U.S. government believed that it helps European
countries and at the same time benefits the U.S. economy by creating European demand for U.S.
commodities. In fact, “the money would be used to buy goods from the United States, and they
had to be shipped across the Atlantic merchant vessels. (But), it worked (the U.S. Diplomatic
mission to Germany).”44 The U.S. also provided a substantial amount of aid to Japan to help
them recover from the war. Doing so brought U.S. products to Japan and highly contributed to
the success of the U.S. companies such as Microsoft in Japan (Ventura 2018). Similarly, the
former U.S. aid recipients, such as South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Vietnam, and Thailand, are now
the top trading partners of the U.S (US Census Bureau).45
Also, those countries where ‘The U.S. the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) aid’ was given to help fight against the AIDS epidemic, in turn, consumed more U.S.
goods and products. In fact, U.S. exports rose 77% in Tanzania, 189% in Zambia, and 241% in
Ethiopia. PEPFAR is one of the decisive determinants of the increase in U.S. pharmaceuticals
exports to Africa (Ventura 2018).
In this regard, foreign aid is not only a form of money and resource transfer from the
wealthy to the poor but also a channel of cultivating the relationship between the donors and
recipients. Bilateral aid can increase bilateral trade through the relationship. Specifically, it is
possible because building a positive relationship through aid allows reducing the transaction cost

44

Direct quote from the website of U.S. Diplomatic mission to Germany
(https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/democrac/57.htm).
45
According to the data from United States Census Bureau, as of October 2019, Mexico is ranked in 2 nd biggest
(53.8 billion dollars) trading partner for the U.S., Japan in 4 th (18.1), Korea in 7th (11.2), Vietnam in 11th (7.4) and
Brazil in 15th (6.2) (https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1910cm.html).
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of trade and promoting a good image of the donor, which increases the attractiveness of
importing donors’ products and services.
4.3.2.1. Foreign Aid as a Political and Economic Linkage
Foreign aid can serve to build a political and economic linkage between the donor and recipient
countries. For instance, given that donor countries often combine aid missions and aid
negotiations with trade missions, the aid relationship might “open door” for donor exporters and
lead to trade agreements (Martinez-Zarzoso et al. 2009; Nowak-Lehmann et al. 2009; NowakLehmann, Felicitas, Martínez-Zarzoso, Herzer, Klasen, and Cardozo 2013). Once the donor
starts transferring aid to the recipient, there is an increase in the recipients' exposure to goods and
services from the donors, which results in future exports to the recipients (Osei et al. 2004, 548).
Similarly, foreign aid itself can function as a “trade policy” (Morrissey 1993). Aid often
attaches economic policy of the recipient countries, such as structural reforms and trade
liberalization. These conditionalities lower the barrier for donors to access the market into the
recipient countries and expand commercial ties by boosting the follow-up orders and purchases.
Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2016, 76) called it the “habit-formation effect” in that donor-funded
exports for aid-related projects might create the patterns of habit for buying products from the
donor countries. Having access to those goods and services, in turn, reinforces the political and
economic linkages and networks between the two countries and reduces the transaction cost of
trade for the future.
4.3.2.2. Foreign aid as a Social and Cultural Association
The bilateral contacts through aid projects can also increase the information on the donor
countries in the recipient countries, which generates positive emotions such as goodwill and
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attractiveness toward donor countries (Berthelemy, Beuran, and Maurel 2009). Those
information and positive images on the donors can make the recipient governments and citizens
prefer donors’ products.
In particular, aid can generate political goodwill in the recipient country, leading to
purchasing products from donors. It is possible because the recipient country may feel
emotionally obligated (or inclined) to do so, showing their ‘goodwill,’ which might secure the
continuous aid flow from donors (McGillivray and Morrissey 1998; Lloyd et al. 2000; Wagner
2003). The concept of goodwill is not new, and several marketing studies have shown its
effectiveness. Going back to the early time, Adam Smith (1759) in The Theory of Moral
Sentiments put it as “sympathy,” described as an intangible asset that capitalizes on preferential
use by customers based on human nature (habit, propensities, beliefs, social customs, etc.). Later,
Nerlove and Arrow (1962) introduced the idea of goodwill in an advertising study and argued
that advertising creates a stock of goodwill, which affects the demand for the product. It could
serve as a similar motivation for getting foreign aid (Arvin and Baum 1997, 73). Giving aid is
considered a favorable and benevolent behavior, and the recipients appreciate it, which leads
them to purchase more donor products.
Moreover, at the individual level, implementing aid projects and programs in recipient
countries can have a demonstration effect to promote donor country’s products (Lloyd et al.
2000; Nowak-Lehmann 2009). Here, the demonstration effect refers to local residents’ adoption
of host consumption and spending behavior. Several tourism studies showed this effect (Murphy
1985; Moore 1995; Burn 1999; Reisinger 2009; Monterrubio and Mendoza-Ontiveros 2014). For
example, Reisinger (2009) argued that locals notice the superior material possessions of tourists
and wish to have the same as a result of the demonstration. That is, the locals in developing
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countries often envy the tourists who are commonly from developed countries and yearn for
them because they are not as wealthy as the tourists are and do not have the same standard of
living. This demonstration effect could work for foreign aid on exports in similar ways. Citizens
in the recipient countries may see the donor countries and their products as superior and
attractive because mostly donor countries are more prosperous and developed than recipients,
just like the relationship between tourists and locals. Therefore, the demand for the donor's
products could grow among the recipient citizens, which leads to an increase in donor's exports
to the recipient countries.
Lastly, there is a macroeconomic effect of foreign aid on export. Foreign aid facilitates
economic development, which increases the recipient’s income and enhances their ability to
purchase more goods and services from other countries (White 1992; McGillivray and Morrissey
1998). However, this mechanism is not considered in this paper for the following two reasons:
first, not all of the recipient countries achieve economic growth, and there is still a debate on the
effectiveness of aid on development. Second, it might explain the increase of the total trade flow
of the recipient countries but does not necessarily explain the bilateral trade relationship of
foreign aid, which is the primary concern of this essay.
In sum, giving and receiving aid is a channel of political, economic, and social exchange
between the governments and people, which physically lowers the transaction cost of trade and
enhances a good image of donor countries socially and emotionally. Those spillover effects of
aid would lead to an increase in donors' export to recipients. In addition, it is noteworthy that
based on these theoretical mechanisms presented in this section, it is expected to see a long-term
effect of aid on exports (which would be even greater than short-term) as well as a short-term
effect of it. It is because those impacts take time to be noticeable since the effect of aid on export
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attribute to indirect mechanisms such as habit formation and demonstration effects (Otor 2017,
62).
Figure 4.1: Theoretical Framework
Foreign Aid

Direct Link: tied aid

Export

+
Indirect Links:
* Political and Economic
Linkage: Transaction Cost and
Habit Formation
* Social and Cultural Linkage:
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4.4. Empirical Analysis
To examine the effect of foreign aid on its export to recipient countries, I empirically analyzed
Korea as a donor country: Korean bilateral aid and its export to the recipient countries. In
particular, Korea is a noteworthy case for the unique experience of ODA and economic
development.
Korea was an aid recipient. For most of the post-war period, Korea heavily relied on
foreign assistance for war recovery and economic development. According to Korean
government estimates, the country received US$ 12.7 billion between 1945 and the late 1990s,
“which helped spur economic development and decrease poverty (OECD 2008, 9).” The
government successfully utilized this financial assistance to overcome various domestic
difficulties through state-led projects designed to facilitate economic development (Evans 1995;
Kim 2011). Owing to this help, Korea became one of the leading economies in the world now.
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As of 2019, its GDP is the 12th largest among the countries: approximately US$ 1.65 trillion
(World Bank).
With the economic success, Korea became the 24th member of DAC in 2009 (after joined
OECD in 1996) and is known for an example among a few aid success stories (Stallings and Kim
2016, 122). Korea spent US$ 2.4 billion on ODA in 2018, which is the 15th largest amount of
aid. This amount corresponds to 0.15% of Korea’s gross national income (GNI), making the
country the 24th largest donor in proportion to its economic size (OECD 2018). It is followed by
Denmark (US$ 2.6 billion), and Korea is the only Asian country in this group except for Japan
(the fourth largest donor, US$ 14.2 billion in 2018) (OECD 2019). In 2019, eighteen DAC
members raised their ODA, and Korea is among them, with the most significant increases in
Finland (+18.2%), Hungary (+14.5%), Korea (+13.9%), Greece (+11.0%), and Norway (+9.7%)
(OECD 2019). Indeed, Korea successfully graduated from an aid recipient and became a newly
emerging donor.
In addition, international trade is critical for national interests. Especially for Korea, its
exported-oriented industry structure and policy have significantly contributed to its economic
development. Korea relied on international trade, which was the main engine of its economic
growth in the 1970s and 1980s (trade as a proportion of total GNP was around between 56% and
68% between 1977 and 1987), and it continued to remain as a key economic strategy for its
sustained development (Sohn 2011, 8). Accordingly, given both facts of its aid history and
development experience, investigating the Korean case allows learning the impact of aid on
donor’s export from another angle, particularly as an emerging donor country, which has been
relatively understudied in the existing literature.
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Furthermore, one of the fundamental issues for dealing with the causal relationship
between aid and trade would be to meet that the trade flow must be more remarkable, given the
presence of aid, than it would be were aid absent. In other words, the effects of aid must result in
a higher level of donor exports to the recipients than would be the case without aid, controlling
for other conditions that might affect trade (Lloyd et al. 2000, 109).
Korea provides an excellent example to address this aspect in that it is relatively
straightforward when the aid rapidly increases, unlike the traditional donors. The latter has kept
giving since the creation of the OECD. Although Korea had received foreign aid until the 1990s,
its ODA history started in the 1960s when the government began training programs with funds
from USAID. Through these programs, the Korean government invited citizens of developing
countries to Korea and provided them with training. In 1965, the Korean government ceased
using USAID funds and began paying for these projects with Korea’s own budget (KOICA
2011).
Then, in the 1990s, Korea reversed its position from a recipient to a donor, as pointed
out earlier. Korea launched the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) in 1987 and
established the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in 1991. With those efforts
and active aid policy implementation, Korean aid has rapidly increased since the 1990s. The
average annual growth rate of ODA reached approximately 23% (KOICA 2021). In this regard,
examining Korean ODA makes it possible to compare no aid to aid with a substantial amount of
bilateral export to recipient countries. To see if this is the case, I run the same model for two
separate periods, 1965 to 1989 and 1990 to 2015, along with the entire period (1965-2015).
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Table 4.1: Korea’s Total Bilateral Aid (unit: US$ million)
Mean
1.20
0.10
2.3

Entire period (1965-2015)
Pre-1990 (1965-1989)
After-1990 (1990-2015)

SD
7.37
0.04
10

4.4.1. Model Specification
The dependent variable in this study is Korean export to the recipient (EXjt), and the independent
variable is Korean bilateral ODA (BAIDjt). Then, I also included several control variables, which
are significant determinants of international trade and typically used in aid-export literature
(Anderson 1979; Bergstrand 1985; Anderson and van Wincoop 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and
Rubinstein 2008; Nowak-Lehmann et al. 2009; Nelson and Juhasz Silva 2012; Otor and Dornan
2017): total aid, GDP, population, import, distance, common religion, WTO, FTA, and exchange
rate.46
In specific, total aid (TOTALjt) is included to capture the overall effect of foreign aid on
the recipient country. Four variables, GDP for the recipient (GDPRjt) and Korea (GDPDt) and
population for the recipient (PORjt) and Korea (PODt), are included to capture the size of the
economy for both donors and recipients. Import (IMjt) is included to capture the bilateral

46

The choice of control variables is mostly based on a gravity model of bilateral trade flow between two countries
(Anderson 1979; Bergstrand 1985; Helpman 1987; Deardorff 1998; Feenstra et al. 2001; Anderson and van
Wincoop 2003; Feenstra 2004; Haveman and Hummels 2004; Kabir, Salim, and Al-Mawali 2017; Osabuohien,
Efobi, Odebiyi, Fayomi, and Salami 2019) along with a few modifications. The main argument of this model is that
the volume of trade between any two countries is positively related to the size of their economies (usually measured
by GDP) and negatively related to the trade costs between them (Piermartini and Teh 2005, 37). Several variables
were generally used to capture the trade costs. Distance and dummies for islands, landlocked, and common borders
were used to capture the transportation costs of trade. They are higher for landlocked countries and islands, while
lower for neighboring countries. Dummies for a common language, adjacency, or other relevant cultural features,
such as colonial history, were used to capture the information costs. If countries have more in common, they are
more likely to have close economic ties by lowering the information costs. Lastly, tariff barriers were generally
included as the form of dummies for the existence of regional trade agreements, which lower the institutional costs
of trade as well (Piermartini and Teh 2005, 37).
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relationship between export and import between the two countries. Distance (DISj) between the
two capitals is included to capture the transportation costs of trade. Common religion
(COMRELj) is included to capture the information costs. If countries have more in common,
they are more likely to have close economic ties by lowering the information costs. WTO
membership (WTOjt & WTOt ) and FTA (FTAjt) are included to capture tariff barriers, which
lower the institutional costs of trade. Lastly, the exchange rate (EXREjt) is included to control for
the price effects of international trade.47
For the specific empirical application, I focused on Korea exports to all its eligible aid
recipient partners over time (i.e., panel dataset). Therefore, aid recipients were indexed by j and
years by t. The model specification is as follows:
lnEXjt = β0 + β1lnBAIDjt + β2lnTOTALjt + β3lnGDPRjt + β4lnGDPDt + β5lnPORjt +
β6lnPODt + β7lnIMjt + β8DISj + β9COMRELj+ β10WTOjt + β11WTOt + β12FTAjt +
β13EXREjt + μj + υt + εjt (1)
ln denotes variables in natural logs. The constant term β0 captures factors that are common to all
years and all trade partners. μj is a time-invariant fixed effect, which captures all unobserved
country-pair-specific factors. It allows for the unobserved heterogeneity that captures the timevariant effect of omitted variables.48 υt is a year-specific effect that captures unobserved factors
specific to the period t, but common to all country pairs, such as trade shock that affects all
countries in a particular year. εjt represents the error term.

47

Bilateral exchange rate controls for price effects in the gravity equation (Soloaga and Winters, 2001). An
appreciation of the exchange rate can be expected to decrease a country’s exports to its trading partners. However,
there are countervailing effects, such as the positive exchange rate effects of rising export levels. Thus, the exchange
rate effect remains ambiguous (Abeysinghe and Yeok, 1998; Otor and Dorman 2017).
48
The distance between the two economic centers (DISj) and common religion (COMRELj) vary only with the “j”
dimension. Thus, these variables are excluded from the fixed effect regression because they are not directly
estimated.
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The description of the variables used in this study is below:
EXjt = Korea’s export to the recipient country j (US$)
BAIDjt = bilateral ODA (disbursement) from Korea (US$)
TOTALjt = total ODA (disbursement) the recipient country j received (US$)
GDPRjt = the recipient country j’s GDP (US$)
GDPDt = Korea GDP (US$)
PORjt = the recipient country j’s population
PODt = Korea’s population
IMjt = total export from recipient j to Korea (i.e., Korea’s import from the recipient)
(US$)
DISj = the distance between Korea and country j (km) (distance between capitals which
was computed as great-circle distances using data on straight-line distances in
kilometers, latitudes and longitudes)
COMRELj = the similarity of the religion between Korea and country j
WTOjt & WTOt = dummy variable, the value of 1 when recipient country j and Korea is
the member of WTO, respectively
FTAjt = dummy variable, the value of 1 when Korea has a free trade agreement in force
with the recipient country j
EXREjt = the nominal bilateral exchange rate in monetary units of the recipient currency
per Won (Korean currency)
4.4.2. Data
The dataset consisted of 50-year observations, ranging from 1965 to 2015 for 162 aid-eligible
countries.49 The data on official development assistance (ODA) disbursements (disbursements
record the actual international transfer of financial resources or the transfer of goods and services
valued at the cost to the donor) were measured in US$ (millions) and were obtained from the
OECD Development Assistance Database (for both of Korean bilateral ODA and total ODA).

Korea’s ODA data is available from 1965 when the Korean government ceased using USAID funds and began
paying for development projects with Korea’s own budget (https://www.kdevelopedia.org/DevelopmentOverview/all/history-korea's-odkoica--201412110000389.do).
49
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The data on Korean exports and imports (in US$, thousands) were from Korea Eximbank (The
Export-Import Bank of Korea). The data on GDP, population, distance (distance between
capitals), FTA, WTO, and common religion were obtained from the CEPII (Centre d'Etudes
Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales) database. Data on bilateral exchange rates were
obtained from UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) database.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Export to Recipient (US$,
thousands)
Korean Bilateral Aid (US$,
millions)
Total Aid (US$, millions)
Import from Recipient
(US$, thousands)
Population (Korea, million)
Population (Recipient,
million)
GDP (Korea, US$)
GDP (Recipient, US$)
Distance (km)
Common Religion
WTO membership (Korea)
WTO membership
(Recipient)
Free Trade Agreement
Bilateral Exchange Rate
Log Export to Recipient
Log Korean Bilateral Aid
Log Total Aid
Log Import from Recipient
Log Population (Korea)
Log Population (Recipient)
Log GDP (Korea)
Log GDP (Recipient)

Mean

SD

Min

Max

606,470

4.848e+06

0

1.459e+08

1.197

7.368

0

244.1

190.6
575,076

530.7
3.671e+06

0
0

24,801
9.025e+07

41.74
23.14

6.484
107.1

28.70
0.00337

50.62
1,371

4.162e+11
5.210e+10
9,803
0.0280
0.960
0.429

4.325e+11
3.094e+11
3,974
0.0281
0.197
0.495

3.018e+09
8.825e+06
155.1
0
0
0

1.410e+12
1.100e+13
19,564
0.122
1
1

0.000667
0.319
8.931
-1.789
2.328
7.751
3.719
0.747
25.72
22.31

0.0258
1.508
3.528
1.204
3.439
4.403
0.164
2.506
1.827
2.214

0
0
0
0
0
0
3.357
-5.693
21.83
15.99

1
27.05
18.80
5.497
10.12
18.32
3.924
7.223
27.97
30.03
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Log Distance

9.068

0.587

5.044

9.881

4.4.3. Methods
The dependent variable is ‘dynamic’ – that is, the past realization of dependent variables might
also affect current year performance. For example, it may not be the current year’s foreign aid
that affects export, but rather the previous year’s aid could play a significant role in the export.
Thus, to capture this characteristic of the panel dataset, I employed the GMM (Generalized
Method of Moments) estimation technique, which is developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
and Blundell and Bond (1998).50 This GMM technique uses lags of the dependent variables as
explanatory variables, and the lagged values of the dependent variables serve as instruments to
control this endogenous relationship. By doing so, the GMM provides consistent results in the
the presence of different sources of endogeneity, “unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and
dynamic endogeneity (Wintoki, Linck, and Netter 2012, 588).”51 For this reason, I applied the

50

Arellano and Bond (1991) firstly proposed using the difference GMM estimation. This estimator removes the
fixed effects by transforming the data and addresses the endogeneity issue by using lagged values as instruments. In
a later study, Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that the difference GMM performs poorly, especially when the
variables are close to a random walk - the lagged levels are not strong instruments for first differenced variables.
Moreover, when the number of time periods is small and the dependent variable is highly persistent, the difference
GMM may be subject to huge sample bias (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano 1999). The system-GMM estimator
improved the efficiency by using both lagged levels as well as lagged differences and system-GMM estimators to
ascertain the robustness of the results. Also, in the system GMM, time-invariant variables can be considered as
regressors such as distance and common religion in the model.
51
"There are two kinds of the methods, known as one-step GMM and two-step GMM, depending on how to
transform the data (which means a statistical process where a variable's past value is subtracted from its present
value, Roodman 2009, 86). However, one-step GMM, which uses the first-difference transformation, has some
limitations. For instance, if a variable's recent value is missing, then the first-difference transformation could result
in the loss of too many observations (Roodman 2009). To avoid this potential data loss, Arellano and Bover (1995)
recommended the use of a second-order transformation (two-step GMM). This two-step GMM subtracts the average
of all future available observations of a particular variable, instead (Roodman 2009, 86). Using a two-step GMM,
researchers can prevent unnecessary data loss, so that in the case of a balanced panel dataset, a two-step GMM
model provides more efficient and consistent estimates for the involved coefficients (Arellano and Bover 1995)
(Ullah, Akhtar, and Zaefarian 2018, 71)."
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two-step system GMM estimation as the most reliable one in dealing with these sources of
endogeneity in addition to the one-step system GMM.52
Hence, in order to model the dynamics of trade relations and to account for the
persistence in trade flows, the lagged dependent variable is included as an additional independent
variable. Finally, the dynamic specification is given by:
lnEXjt = β0 + lnEXjt-1 + β1lnBAIDjt + β2lnTOTALjt + β3lnGDPRjt + β4lnGDPDt +
β5lnPORjt + β6lnPODt + β7lnIMjt + β8DISj + β9COMRELj + β10WTOjt + β11WTOt
+ β12FTAjt + β13EXREjt + μj + υt + εjt’ (2)
Where EXjt-1 represents exports from Korea to country j in period t-1 and all of the other
variables are the same as described in equation (1).
Concerning the robustness check of the estimation technique for the empirical test, I
utilized other techniques along with the GMM: OLS (with PCSE), random and fixed effect
analysis. The results of these estimations are also presented in the following results sections.

4.5. Results and Discussions
Table 3 shows the results of the empirical analysis, which covered the entire period of the dataset
between 1965 and 2015: OLS (PCSE), Random, and Fixed effect,53 one-step, and two-step

52

The problem may be addressed using instrumental variables. However, finding proper instrumental variables is
not easy and sometimes impossible (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, and Lalive, 2010; Antonakis and House, 2014).
The fundamental problem of the instrumental variable approach is the identification of the models due to the high
complications such as not having sufficient data, high correlations of instrumental variables, and deficient order and
rank conditions (Bentler and Chou 1987; Martens and Haase 2006). Also, researchers should have strong theoretical
arguments to build the directions of hypotheses and models for using specific instrumental variables.
53
Concerning the appropriateness of using Fixed effect over Random effect dealing with unobserved heterogeneity
in the panel dataset, this paper performed the Hausman test. The result (p < 0.000) implies that using a fixed effect is
preferable because there some characteristics of the individual in the panel that does not change over time which
affects the dependent variable.
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system GMM. Then, Table 4 presents the results, which separated the period into two, one from
1965 to 1989 (Column (1), (3), (5)) and the other from 1990 to 2015 (Column (2), (4), (6)) using
Fixed Effect, one-step, and two-step GMM estimation methods.
In general, the coefficients of Korean bilateral aid lie in a range of 0.06 to 0.21 (the shortrun impact of bilateral aid on export). It is statistically significant for the entire period (19652015) by using OLS and system-GMM methods. Although the two other methods (random and
fixed effects) did not reach statistical significance, they still show positive signs.54 Thus, the
results support the theoretical expectation that foreign aid increases donor’s export by showing
that Korean bilateral ODA is positively related to export to recipients.
For further analysis and interpretation, I mainly used the results of the two-step system
GMM estimator (Column (5)) for the following reasons. First, given the persistence of the export
flow, it is more appropriate to rely on the dynamic models (equation (2)) which GMM estimators
(Column (4) and (5)) are designed for dealing with. In addition, this GMM estimator accounts
better for the other possible sources of endogeneity of bilateral aid, which satisfied the conditions
for the estimators’ validity: Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond test for the first and second order
correlation.55

54

Also, it is a rule-of-thumb that the pooled OLS estimates biased upwards and fixed effect estimates biased
downward (Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple, 2001), which is shown in this result as well.
55
When applying the GMM model, researchers need to apply two post-estimation tests to determine whether an
appropriate econometric model is applied. These tests are (1) the Sargan test and (2) the Arellano-Bond test for the
first order and second order correlation. First, a critical assumption for the validity of GMM estimates requires that
instruments are exogenous. In other words, the findings from GMM will not valid if the instruments are
endogenously determined. Sargan test is used to determine whether the econometric model is valid or not, and
whether the instruments are correctly specified or not. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the researcher needs to
reconsider the model or the instruments used in the estimation process. On the other hand, if the Sargan test turns
out to be insignificant it implies that the instruments included in the econometric specifications are exogenous.
Second, to examine the validity of a strong exogeneity assumption, the Arellano-Bond test for no auto-correlation
(or no serial correlation) is used under the null hypothesis that the error terms for two different time periods are
uncorrelated. In other words, it means that the lagged variables are not correlated with the error term (Ullah, Akhtar,
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Table 4.3: Korean Bilateral ODA on Export (1965-2015)

Export (lag, log)
Korean Bilateral Aid
(log)
Import from
Recipients (log)
Total Aid (log)
Distance (log)
Population
(Recipients) (log)
GDP (Recipients)
(log)
Population (Korea)
(log)
GDP (Korea) (log)
Common Religion
WTO (Korea)
WTO (Recipient)
Free Trade
Agreement
Bilateral Exchange
Rate
Constant

(1)
OLS
(PCSE)

(2)
Random
Effect

(3)
Fixed Effect

-

-

-

0.078***
(0.025)
0.028***
(0.008)
0.026**
(0.011)
-0.193*
(0.109)
-0.225***
(0.040)
1.082***
(0.043)
7.00***
(1.840)
0.209
(0.158)
-1.795
(1.659)
0.038
(0.128)
0.080
(0.092)
0.118
(0.475)
0.048
(0.037)
-45.19***
(3.300)

0.0125
(0.0214)
0.0534***
(0.00796)
0.0489***
(0.0122)
-0.364**
(0.172)
-0.173***
(0.0591)
0.902***
(0.0419)
2.328**
(0.994)
0.656***
(0.0878)
-7.991*
(4.215)
-0.110
(0.689)
0.0655
(0.0641)
-0.0724
(0.538)
0.0670***
(0.0255)
-33.82***
(2.315)

0.000837
(0.0212)
0.0448***
(0.00803)
0.0565***
(0.0123)
-

Long-run effect of
Korean ODA

-1.596***
(0.169)
0.734***
(0.0480)
5.993***
(1.043)
0.698***
(0.0865)
-0.102
(0.747)
0.108*
(0.0655)
-0.0635
(0.529)
0.0633**
(0.0259)
-45.69***
(1.992)

(4)
One-step
System
GMM
0.601***
(0.0376)
0.0663**
(0.0273)
0.0248**
(0.0113)
0.0377*
(0.0203)
-0.106
(0.360)
-0.266**
(0.106)
0.646***
(0.0933)
-

(5)
Two-step
System
GMM
0.642***
(0.0507)
0.0723***
(0.0272)
0.0255*
(0.0132)
0.0300
(0.0257)
0.117
(0.424)
-0.185
(0.122)
0.551***
(0.105)
-

-0.438***
(0.160)
0.403
(6.082)
-

-0.368**
(0.173)
-0.409
(6.144)
-

0.118
(0.131)
0.402
(0.291)
0.0553**
(0.0216)
-

0.0889
(0.131)
0.420
(0.278)
0.0414
(0.0263)
0.202***
(0.082)

and Zaefarian 2018, 76). The values for these two post-estimation tests are reported in both Table 3 and 4, which
confirmed that the instruments used in this estimation process are valid.
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$ Return of Korean
ODA in the long-run
Observations
R-squared
Number of Countries
Number of
Instruments
AR(1)
AR(2)
Sargan

36.619
3,876
0.676
-

3,876
0.709
163
-

3,876
0.716
163
-

Standard errors in parentheses

3,807
162
76

3,807
162
76

0.000
0.153
123.122

0.000
0.151
123.122

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
In specific, the aid coefficient equals 0.072 (Column (5)) and is statistically significant (p
< 0.01), which implies the short-term impact of foreign aid on export. That is, a percentage
change in Korean bilateral aid leads to 0.072% increase in export in the short-term, on average,
other things are being equal.
I also calculated the long-run elasticity for further analysis, and the result is 0.20 (p =
0.015).56 A percentage change in Korean bilateral aid leads to 0.20% increase in export in the
long run, on average, other things are being equal. Indeed, Korea bilateral aid has a more
significant positive effect on export in the long run (0.20) than in the short run (0.074).
Explaining it in a more intuitive way of this impact, the average return on aid for Korean
bilateral aid is approximately US$ 36.62 increase in exports for each dollar spent.57 This result

56

̂
β

This long-run effect of GMM estimator result is calculated according to the following formula:

p

1−∑

j=1

̂j
ϕ

, where

β denotes the coefficients for the variable log Korean ODA, p stands for the number of lags included into the model,
and ϕ denotes the coefficients for the variable lag log export (see Zuazu-Bermejo 2015, 12).
57

The long-run average returns of ODA on export is calculated according to the following formula:

∂X
∂Y

X

= βi X ,
Y

where βi denotes the coefficients for the variable log Korean ODA; X denotes the average of exports, Y denotes the
averages of Korean aid. The coefficient is taken from Table 2 and the averages from Table 1 (see Otor and Dornan
2017, 20).
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implies that in the long run and over the period, the monetary return of Korean bilateral aid on its
export is more than proportional.
Concerning year dummies in GMM estimators, which control for time variations of
exports across the panel, the sign of the coefficient is changed from negative to positive at
around the year 1990 (Figure 2). This change suggests that the exports of the year during 19651989, on average, tend to be lower than the previous years. In contrast, those of the year after
1990, on average, tend to be higher than the previous years. For example, on average and other
things are being equal, export in 1967 is 77% lower than the year 1966 (β = -1.268), while export
in 1995 is 26% higher than the year 1994 (β = 0.0705).58 This result corresponds to the time
when Korean ODA has proliferated, which justifies separating the data between pre-1990 and
post-1990 and further investigates the impact of ODA on export.

-1
-3

-2

Export (log)

0

1

Figure 4.2: Year Effect on Export

1960

1980

2000

2020

Year

̂

58

This time effect is calculated according to the following formula: [ⅇβ − 1] ∗ 100, where e is the exponent of the
natural logs and β denotes the coefficient for the year dummy variable (Giles 2011).
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Table 4.4: Korean Bilateral ODA on Export – applied to different periods
Fixed Effect
(1965(19901989)
2015)
(1)
(2)
Export (lag,
log)

One-step System GMM
(1965(19901989)
2015)
(3)
(4)

Two-step System GMM
(1965(1990-2015)
1989)
(6)
(5)

-

-

0.592***
(0.0460)

0.455***
(0.0809)

0.552***
(0.0570)

0.574***
(0.0848)

-0.360**
(0.157)

0.0978***
(0.0200)

0.252
(0.207)

0.136***
(0.0480)

0.192
(0.244)

0.0947**
(0.0377)

0.0231*
(0.0125)

0.0442***
(0.00941)

0.0125
(0.0154)

0.0185
(0.0211)

0.0115
(0.0169)

0.0122
(0.0201)

Total Aid
(log)

-0.00195
(0.0292)

0.0214*
(0.0130)

0.0433
(0.0534)

0.0289
(0.0242)

0.0117
(0.0686)

0.0260
(0.0199)

Distance
(log)

-

-

0.366
(0.384)

0.698
(0.504)

-0.0108
(0.452)

0.561
(0.479)

-0.641
(0.392)

-1.219***
(0.279)

-0.263
(0.194)

-0.375*
(0.197)

-0.188
(0.255)

-0.245*
(0.126)

0.853***
(0.0961)

0.626***
(0.0614)

0.497***
(0.161)

0.915***
(0.245)

0.495**
(0.191)

0.648***
(0.169)

1.343
(2.120)

7.484***
(1.025)

-

-

-

-

1.178***
(0.181)

0.161*
(0.0970)

-0.164
(0.191)

-0.807***
(0.265)

-0.395
(31.71)

-0.544**
(0.218)

-

-

-17.69
(13.76)

-11.83
(13.23)

-10.66
(12.85)

-12.38
(12.83)

WTO
(Korea)

-0.405
(0.816)

-

-

-

-

-

WTO
(Recipient)
Free Trade
Agreement

-0.0386
(0.201)
-

0.207***
(0.0743)
-0.0703
(0.394)

0.785*
(0.424)
-

0.334
(0.225)
0.227
(0.660)

0.674*
(0.363)
-

0.0913
(0.194)
0.731
(0.759)

Korean
Bilateral
Aid (log)
Import from
Recipients
(log)

Population
(Recipients)
(log)
GDP
(Recipients)
(log)
Population
(Korea)
(log)
GDP
(Korea)
(log)
Common
Religion

100

Bilateral
Exchange
Rate

0.127
(0.150)

0.00103
(0.0324)

0.196
(0.196)

0.0938**
(0.0375)

0.112
(0.241)

0.0493
(0.0390)

Constant

-44.28***
(3.750)

-35.54***
(2.840)

-

-

-

-

The longrun effect of
Korean
ODA
$ Return of
Korean
ODA in the
long-run
Observation
s
R-Square
Number of
Countries
Number of
Instruments
AR(1)
AR(2)
Sargan

0.222**
(0.090)
38.26

1,544

2,332

1,503

2,199

1,503

2,199

0.666

0.322

-

-

-

-

127

161

127

160

127

160

-

-

56

50

56

50

0.000
0.610
67.956

0.002
0.142
124.806

-

0.000
0.000
0.578
0.127
67.956
124.806
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

Table 4 shows the results. Comparing the results dividing the sample into these two
periods indicates that most of the effect of Korean ODA on export comes from the later period
(1990-2015) rather than the early period (1965-1989). All of the aid coefficients for the later
period are positive and statistically significant, while none of those for the early period does
show any statistical significance. The coefficient for the fixed effect estimator (column (1)) even
shows a negative sign, which is statistically significant.
Specifically, the aid coefficient equals 0.095, the short-term impact for the period of
1990-2015 (column (6)), which is larger than that of the entire period (1965-2015, 0.072, Table
101

2). It means that a percentage change in Korean bilateral aid leads to 0.095% increase in export
in the short-term (p < 0.05), on average, other things are being equal.
For the next step, the long-run elasticity is 0.22, which is statistically significant (p =
0.016). It means that a percentage change in Korean bilateral aid leads to 0.22% increase in
export in the long run, on average, other things are being equal (for the comparison, it is 0.20 for
the entire period). Thus, it can be interpreted as Korean bilateral aid has a larger positive effect
on export in the long run (0.20) than in the short-run (0.074). In other words, the average return
on aid for Korean bilateral aid is approximately US$ 38.26 increase in exports for each dollar
spent (for the comparison, it is US$ 36.62 for the entire period).
When it comes to the rest of the control variables, a couple of factors show a robust
relationship with exports. First, the lagged export variables are positive and statistically
significant. The result indicates that there is a lagged relationship in exports. That is, the previous
export is related to the current export, and it persists over time. This is important because it not
only confirms the existence of time dynamics of the dependent variable in this model but also
provides evidence of the indirect mechanisms of foreign aid on its export to the recipient (e.g.,
habit formation). That is, once the door opened, it tends to remain. The recipient GDP variables
are also positive and statistically significant. It makes sense that wealthier recipients buy more
products because they can do so, which is confirmed in this study. However, for the effect of the
time-invariant variables, geographical closeness and common culture show mixed results. It is
not empirically true that Korea trades more with geographically or historically closer countries.
In sum, these empirical results support the theoretical argument of the effect of foreign
aid on its donor’s export. Foreign aid increases donors’ export toward the recipient countries. In
addition, the effect becomes larger over time, which provides some evidence on the indirect and
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informal mechanisms of aid to its export, such as habit formation and goodwill motivation. It is
because those effects take more time to be visible than the tied (and direct) mechanism of aid on
donor’s export to recipients.

4.6. Conclusion
This essay examined the relationship between foreign aid and export, for the case of Korea from
1965 to 2015. Theoretically, it argued that foreign aid promotes donor’s export to the recipient
for two reasons: (1) there are direct mechanisms when explicit and implicit tied-aid agreements
are involved; and (2) giving aid and implementing aid policy involves transferring money and
people. Thus, it not only aims to promote the economic development of recipients but also can
serve as building the political, economic, and social relationships between donor and recipient
countries. As a result, those spillover effects of foreign aid can increase the export of donor
countries to recipients.
Then, by applying a dynamic gravity model with GMM estimators, I provided empirical
evidence that Korean bilateral ODA is positively related to its export to the recipients. Given that
Korean aid increased rapidly in the 1990s, the model further estimated the effect for 1990–2015
as well as the entire period. The result showed that the impact of Korean ODA on its exports is
more significant in the post-1990s than in the pre-1990. It is valid for both the short-term and
long run. In specific, for the later period, a percentage increase in Korean bilateral aid is
associated with 0.095% increase in export in the short-term and 0.22% increase in export in the
long run. The long-term return to export is US$ 38.26 for each US$ 1 of aid disbursed.
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These empirical findings of this essay are in line with the existing aid-trade literature, in
general: bilateral aid promotes donor' exports to the recipient countries. However, examining the
Korean ODA case also contributes to the literature by revealing some variations of the aid
impact on export. First, it showed that Korea enjoys a significant amount of trade benefits from
the aid compared to other traditional donors. Second, the long-term effect of aid on export is
more prominent than its short-term impact.
In addition, the findings offer inspiring news to the international community and the
donor countries, especially those who face the reluctance and resistance of the domestic audience
to giving aid. Giving aid is benign and humanitarian behavior. However, it also gives tangible
national interests to the donor’s countries at the same time. Indeed, ODA can be an investment in
the recipient countries that boosts the donor’s economic interests.
Lastly, some weaknesses of this study need to be mentioned, which can be the potential
research agenda for the future. This study used the aggregate data for aid and export, the total
bilateral aid and the total volume of export. Therefore, it might be interesting to examine the
relationship between different types of aid and sectoral exports to see if any specific types of aid
are more related to some of the export industries than others. Second, based on the long-run
effect, which was calculated by using a statistical formula, this essay was only able to tentatively
conclude that aid increases donor’s export through indirect mechanisms (political and social ties)
as well as tied conditions. Thus, it would be better to see if the actual perception of recipient
government officials and citizens toward the donors' countries is changed or not, which might be
obtained by conducting an experiment or public opinion survey. By doing so, the theoretical
argument of the political and social tie mechanisms of aid can be supported more strongly.
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Chapter 5. CONCLUSION

This dissertation contributes to providing a better understanding of the effectiveness of foreign
aid: whether foreign aid achieves its goals and how it affects the recipient and donor countries
and international relations. Foreign aid can serve several goals and influence many areas at the
same time. The primary aim of aid is to support long-term capacity growth, poverty alleviation,
and political development in recipient countries. However, the impact of aid is not limited to the
area. Aid policy can also promote international trade and cultivate the soft power of donor
countries. Accordingly, when it comes to examining the effectiveness of foreign aid, we should
consider these various outcomes, including economic growth, political development, and
international relations. My dissertation attempts to integrate some of these various impacts of
foreign aid: promoting economic growth, reducing the recipient countries’ political violence, and
increasing the export of the donor countries. Each essay in this dissertation highlights how and
when foreign aid is effective in achieving these goals. Foreign aid helps the recipient/s economic
growth when it is spent as it is intended for, providing pubic goods (Chapter 2). Foreign aid can
deter the political violence of the recipient countries, such as civil war and domestic terrorist
attacks, when it helps countries’ economic growth (Chapter 3). Foreign aid also facilitates
donor’s export to the recipient country (Chapter 4). By investigating the effectiveness of foreign
aid in this broader way, economic and political development for the recipient country and foreign
policy for the donor countries, we can assess the effect and efficacy of foreign aid in a more
proper and practical sense.
Chapter 2 examines when foreign aid can help the recipient country’s economic
performance. The chapter contributes to the existing literature on aid-growth in that I reveal that
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the effectiveness of foreign aid depends on how to spend the money, and the political leaders’
survival strategy primarily determines it. When and only the political leaders are motivated to
spend the aid money for providing public goods, rather than for their own interests, aid is
effective and leads to economic growth. The theoretical prediction is tested using a panel dataset
of aid and growth rates for 82 recipient countries between 1960 and 2010. The empirical analysis
finds support for the hypothesis that foreign aid increases the economic growth rate of the
recipient country where the size of winning coalition is large.
These findings draw some policy direction and recommendations. Most importantly, the
donors and international aid agencies should better understand the diverse recipient countries’
political environments, which affect their aid practices and effectiveness. In specific,
policymakers should avoid adopting a homogeneous aid allocation policy for all recipient
countries as much as possible. It is not to say that donor countries and international society
should abandon aid policy altogether, but improve the efficiency of aid provision in the
countries.
For example, it might be necessary to have regional experts and local people familiar
with the political environments participate in making a policy decision and implementing aid
policy. Furthermore, during the operation process, the donor countries and international
organizations should closely monitor whether aid is allocated as designed and timely to secure
the aid’s effectiveness. It is especially crucial when the money goes to poorly governed and
strongly elites-centered countries. Lastly, thorough analysis and evaluation of the aid policy
should be conducted regularly after aid implementation, focusing on finding when, where, and
how aid is effectively implemented to improve aid policy quality further.
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Chapter 3 examines the effect of foreign aid on the incidence of political violence in the
recipient countries. This chapter aims to understand how foreign aid affects political violence.
Departed from the argument of Chapter 2, I further theorize that aid can deter the political
violence in the recipient country via its role of economic growth, which changes the balance of
power between government and the potential rebels. That is, economic growth strengthens the
government and weakens the potential challengers. Using data for aid and civil war and domestic
terrorist attack, the empirical analysis demonstrates that the recipient country experiences fewer
civil wars and domestic terrorist attacks when the country are under economic growth, which is
more likely to occur in the society of the large winning coalition. This study’s findings suggest
that foreign aid may not directly reduce the political violence of the recipient country, but it
helps through its mechanism of economic growth.
The central contribution of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence of the indirect
role of foreign aid on political violence by utilizing the IMM strategy. Some literature has argued
this indirect mechanism of aid-growth to political violence. However, to my knowledge, this is
the first study to provide empirical evidence that aid statistically and significantly reduces the
incidence of civil wars and terrorist attacks via its indirect role in economic growth. The
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence reveal that the effect of foreign aid is not limited to
its direct purpose, that is, reducing poverty and growing economy of the recipient countries. It
has its indirect and consequent effects, achieving its political stability if it is well-implemented,
as in this chapter. In this sense, the empirical findings of this study add reasons to endorse the
international cooperation and developmental aid policy: the positive effect of its economic
performance through the aid can also lead to other positive changes of the recipient countries,
such as their political development and stability.
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Chapter 4 investigates the effect of foreign aid on donor’s export to the recipient. This
chapter theorizes that foreign aid increases export from donors to recipients because it builds
political, economic, and social exchanges that lower trade transaction costs. Using data on
Korean bilateral aid and export to recipient countries between 1965 and 2015, the empirical
analyses find that bilateral aid is positively associated with donor export to the recipient. The
results also indicate that the effect of aid on export became even more prominent in the longer
term.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by providing a theoretical mechanism
through which aid can increase donors’ export to the recipient, emphasizing that aid
implementation and practice promote political, economic, and social exchange between the
countries. By doing so, the empirical evidence of this study provides inspiring news to the donor
countries and international community, specifically those suffering intense criticism and
skepticism of international aid policy. As shown in this essay, offering aid is not just for charity
to the recipient countries but also gives practical and perceptible benefits to the donor’s
economy. Aid policy can be an investment that boosts the donor’s exports and international
trade. Indeed, this chapter serves as an example showing that international aid can make a winwin situation for both the recipients and the donors, which mitigates aid negativism and
advocates international aid programs.
To conclude, this dissertation demonstrated that aid has positive effects on its recipient
and donor countries and international relations. Theoretical and empirical analyses of each essay
altogether suggest that foreign aid can be an effective international cooperation policy and
developmental tool to build a better and prosperous world if carried out and monitored in proper
ways.
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